Sartre and Husserl’s Phenomenology

Jean-Paul Sartre's engagement with Edmund Husserl's phenomenology played a pivotal role in shaping his philosophical outlook. Sartre's thought is is characterized by both debt to and his departure from Husserl’s phenomenological method.

Sartre was introduced to Husserl’s phenomenology during his time in Berlin in the early 1930s, a period of intellectual transformation for the young philosopher. Husserl's phenomenological project, which aimed to return to the "things themselves" by exploring consciousness and its intentional structures, profoundly influenced Sartre. Husserl’s work offered a way to break free from the idealism dominating French philosophy at the time, and Sartre enthusiastically embraced phenomenology as a means to engage with the concrete reality of lived experience.

However, Sartre’s relationship with Husserl was not one of uncritical acceptance. While he was deeply influenced by Husserl’s Ideen I, Sartre was equally committed to modifying and challenging its conclusions. In particular, Sartre took issue with Husserl’s concept of the transcendental ego, which Husserl claimed was essential for the unity of consciousness. Sartre rejected this, arguing that the ego is not an essential component of consciousness but rather something that emerges from reflective acts. For Sartre, consciousness is fundamentally intentional and directed outward toward the world, not inherently tied to a stable ego.

Sartre’s reinterpretation of phenomenology culminated in his own groundbreaking work Being and Nothingness (1943), where he develops his concept of "nothingness" as central to human existence. Sartre argues that consciousness is not a “thing” in itself but a process of negation that allows humans to transcend their given conditions. This marks a significant departure from Husserl, who emphasized the stability of the ego within the framework of intentionality. Sartre, by contrast, insists that human beings are constantly in the process of self-creation, free to define themselves but burdened by the weight of this freedom.

The chapter also delves into Sartre’s work on imagination, a theme that emerged from his engagement with Husserl’s thought. Sartre’s early works, such as The Imaginary (1940), reflect his attempt to grapple with how consciousness relates to non-existent objects, such as those encountered in imagination and dreams. Sartre built on Husserl’s insights but also critiqued what he saw as Husserl’s over-reliance on abstract essences. For Sartre, imagination was not merely a passive reflection of mental content but an active, creative process that reveals the freedom inherent in human consciousness.

In essence, while Sartre drew heavily from Husserl’s phenomenology, he transformed it into something uniquely his own. His emphasis on freedom, negation, and the fluidity of consciousness set him apart from Husserl’s more structured and ego-centered approach. Sartre’s phenomenology, as outlined in this chapter, became a dynamic tool for understanding the human condition, one that emphasized the existential struggles of freedom, responsibility, and self-creation.

Know more:

Five Key Thinkers in Phenomenology

Heidegger's "Dasein" compared with Husserl's "transcendental I"

Edmund Husserl was the founder of phenomenology while Martin Heidegger was its main precursor. Both philosophers include within their phenomenological theory a conception of "self" or "selfhood" as that which experiences phenomena. But while Husserl calls this self the "transcendental I", Heidegger's version is much more immanent and is called Dasein ("being-there").

Transcendental I vs Dasein

Edmund Husserl's concept of the "transcendental I" refers to the subject or ego that is the source of all conscious experience. According to Husserl, the transcendental I is a pre-reflective, pre-theoretical level of consciousness that underlies all of our experience and thought. It is the point of origin for all of our intentions and actions, and it is the source of our ability to direct our attention and to form concepts.

Martin Heidegger's concept of Dasein refers to the human mode of being or existence. Heidegger describes Dasein as being-in-the-world, which means that humans are not just conscious beings, but also beings that are always situated in a specific context or environment. Dasein is characterized by its ability to ask questions about its own existence and to engage in self-reflection.

Overall, the concepts of the "transcendental I" and Dasein both explore the nature of the human self and its relationship to the world. However, while Husserl's concept of the "transcendental I" emphasizes the subjective, consciousness-based nature of the self, Heidegger's concept of Dasein emphasizes the embodied, contextual nature of the self and its existence in the world.

Similarities and differences

One key similarity between Heidegger's "Dasein" and Husserl's "transcendental I" is that both Husserl and Heidegger were interested in understanding how we experience the world and how our subjective experience shapes our understanding of reality.

However, there are also significant differences between the two philosophers. One key difference is their focus and areas of interest. While Husserl is known for his work on the nature of consciousness and the self, Heidegger's work is more concerned with the nature of being and existence. Heidegger's concept of Dasein, which refers to the human mode of being or existence as being-in-the-world, is a central part of his philosophy and distinguishes his approach from that of Husserl.

Another key difference is their methodologies. While Husserl's approach is more systematic and formal, Heidegger's approach is more interpretive and hermeneutic. This difference is reflected in the way that the two philosophers approach the study of Phenomenology and the kinds of questions that they seek to answer.

Learn more:

What is phenomenology

Five key thinkers in phenomenology

Phenomenology between Husserl and Heidegger

Understanding Dasein: Heidegger’s Notion of Human Existence

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*The writing of this text was assisted by OpenAI’s GPT-3 model and modified by the author.

Five Key Thinkers in Phenomenology

Phenomenology is a philosophical movement that originated in the early 20th century and focuses on the study of consciousness and the objects of direct experience. This philosophical movement owes to thinkers like Hegel but essentially started with Edmund Husserl (see: origins of phenomenology. Other prominent thinkers in the field of phenomenology include Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Emmanuel Levinas. Here is a brief review of their work with links to further learning.

Edmund Husserl: father of phenomenology

Edmund Husserl is considered the founder of phenomenology. His famous philosophical call was to go "back to things themselves and study of actual human experience. Husserl developed the concept of "intentionality," which refers to the fact that consciousness is always directed towards something. He also introduced the ideas of the "phenomenological reduction" and "Epoché" which are a method for bracketing out preconceptions and focusing on the immediate experience of phenomena. Here you can find a study guide to Husserl's thought. 

Martin Heidegger: being in the world

Martin Heidegger is one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century, and his work had a significant impact on phenomenology. He pointed out, after Husserl, that phenomenology should examine the phenomenon of existence itself, what he called the question of being. Heidegger is best known for his concepts of Dasein and "being-in-the-world," which emphasizes the inseparability of human beings from their environment. He also developed the idea of "ontological difference," which asserts that there is a fundamental distinction between beings and the being of beings. Another influential thought by Heidegger is that of "being-towards-death" which means the meaning of our life is determined by our relationship with our death. Here you can find an introduction to Martin Heidegger's Philosophy

Jean-Paul Sartre: existence precedes essence

Jean-Paul Sartre was a French philosopher who was heavily influenced by both Husserl and Heidegger. He is best known for his concept of "existentialism," which emphasizes the individual's freedom and responsibility in creating their own meaning in life. Sartre also developed the idea of "bad faith," which occurs when an individual denies their own freedom and acts inauthentically. One of Sartre's best known claims is that "existence precedes essence" meaning that the essence of out lives is not predetermined but left for us to decide if we like it or not.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty: the lived body

Maurice Merleau-Ponty was a French philosopher who was influenced by both Husserl and Heidegger. He is known for his concept of "phenomenological ontology," which asserts that the structure of human experience is fundamentally embodied and intersubjective. He also emphasized the importance of the "lived body" in our experience of the world. Merleau-Ponty was also influential in the thoght of human rights right after world war two.

Emmanuel Levinas: the face of the other

Emmanuel Levinas was a French philosopher who is known for his emphasis on the ethical implications of our relations with others. In other words, Levinas turned phenomenology and its questions of being into a study of ethical existence.Levinas developed the idea of "the face of the other," which emphasizes the infinite responsibility that we have towards others. In his later years he also introduced the concept of "substitution," which refers to the idea that we are responsible for the suffering of others. Here you can find a simple introduction to Levinas with additional articles.

More articles, explanation and summaries to be found in our What is Phenomenolgy page.

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*This text was created with the aid of OpenAI’s GPT-3 model and modified by the author.

Phenomenology between Husserl and Heidegger - summary

Martin Heidegger was the next big thinker of Phenomenology after Edmund Husserl. The shift from Husserl's phenomenology to Heidegger's can be pin-pointed to the idea the existence itself cannot be described by the phenomenological reduction and epoché.

Heidegger was Husserl's assistant working on his phenomenological method. Husserl's Phenomenology offered Heidegger a method of exploring reality and the demand to return to things themselves. From this, Heidegger realized that it is in the most pragmatic and most naive experience in the world where the human being becomes aware of himself and his environment. Thus the primacy of ordinary everyday life is recognized, where Dasein receives the first concrete experience of the being of that which is.

Heidegger rejected his teacher's concept of Transcendental I or Consciousness. For him life cannot be viewed from outside, but only from within the lived experience of existing. Heidegger rejected Husserl's phenomenological reduction to a transcendental ego that confronted the world merely perceptively. Heidegger describes the phenomenon as “that which shows itself in itself”, as that which shows itself in beings as what they are: the being of beings. From this he concludes: "Ontology is only possible as phenomenology". In other words, the phenomenological inquiry, for Heidegger, must not bear so much on experiences of consciousness, as on the being for whom one can speak of such experiences, and who is thereby capable of phenomenalization, namely Dasein , that is to say, the existing.

In 1933 Husserl and all other Jews were expelled from the University of Freiburg while Heidegger was made its rector. The first edition of Heidegger's 1927 "Being and Time" was dedicated to his teacher and initial patron, but the dedication was removed in his 1941 edition. Heidegger never apologized for siding with the Nazis, benefiting from their rule and betraying his biggest teacher.  

Read more: Heidegger's "Dasein" compared with Husserl's "transcendental I".

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Husserl's Ideas I - summary

Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, also known as Ideas I, is Edmund Husserl's second major work after Logical Investigations. Husserl's  Ideas I presents  a philosophy whose task is to clarify the meaning that the world has for us in our daily lives. This is because the very life that the phenomenologist reflects on has an intentional character that coincides with an expanded notion of meaning that Husserl calls 'meaning' (Sinn). According to him, the world is what our experience refers to and at the same time the context in which we live. As a context the world is always something implicit. So, in order to explain the meaning of this implicitness, it is first necessary to stop supposing it as the foundation of the experience and recover it as the objective term to which it refers. This is what the transcendental reduction aims at.

 

 

Transcendental reduction and epoché in Idead I

In Ideas I is Husserl first introduces the subject of the transcendental reduction and epoché. This reduction is a method through which Husserl proposes to access transcendental subjectivity or pure consciousness through a series of steps or reductions. One of these reductions is the eidetic reduction, which consists of taking objects that are presented to consciousness as mere examples of essences that are obtained by eidetic variation similar to his notions in the Logical Investigations).

 

One on the key ideas of Ideas I is that of transcendental reduction as the suspension or bracketing of the belief in the reality of the world.  For Husserl, this reduction radically discovers the world as a world lived in, because with the disconnection of the belief in the reality of the world, the phenomenologist necessarily concentrates on the field of lived consciousness in which it appears and even acquires its character of reality. In other words, reduction leads us to awareness of our own lived relation to things. Only by Bracketing the world as a real world is it possible to pay attention to the world as it is lived by us. While the transcendental reduction opens the field of pure consciousness, the eidetic reduction allows us to capture what appears there in terms of essences and essential relationships. The attitude in which we live daily when we do not do philosophy is referred to by Husserl as natural attitude as opposed to a transcendental attitude.

 

Noesis and Noema

Husserl observes that after the transcendental reduction all intentional experience continues to have a double structure: a noetic side and a noematic side. While noesis refers to the way in which something is experienced, noema refers to what the experience points to as its object.​ In the intentional correlation between noesis and noema, experiences are interwoven in synthetic structures. In response to this, we can speak of a syntax of experiences that is analogous to that of language, but much more fundamental. Husserl called the study of this assigning of meaning Constitution. 

 

 

Impact of Ideas I

In later works after Ideas I Husserl will propose various ways of carrying out the various reductions that lead to transcendental subjectivity. From this work onwards it will be clear to Husserl that the task of philosophy understood in this way is to explain the origin and meaning of the world by reflecting on intentional experience. 

Husserl planned his Ideas Relating to a Pure Phenomenology and a Phenomenological Philosophy in three volumes. The only finished volume was the first, which we have referred to in this section. The second and third volumes were published posthumously.

 

 

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Husserl's Logical Investigations - Summary

Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations, published in two volumes in 1900 and 1901, presents for the first time his ideas about transcendental phenomenology. In it Husserl presents a sharp critique of psychologism and develops some concepts such as intentionality which will occupy a central place in phenomenology. Intentionality is described there as the property of experiences as referring to something.  Consciousness for Husserl is necessarily intentional, that is, all experiences necessarily refer to objects. 

 

Phenomenology appears in Logical Investigations as a science of essences that must proceed according to a strict scientific method. One of the methods Husserl offers is the eidetic variation, which consists of comparing several intentional objects to highlight a common essence and to study it as a mere possibility. Another methodical element is called a mereology, or theory of wholes and parts, from which it is necessary to distinguish between independent and non-independent parts of the essences of intentional objects. 

Finally, the method advanced by Husserl in Logical Investigations also assumes a theory of intentional experiences. .According to this theory, the question about the intentional meaning is answered from the perceptual experiences in which real or ideal objects are captured.  Husserl distinguishes between experiences that present their objects and experiences that are "empty". For him it is possible to think of the experiences in which ideas are grasped or intuited as experiences analogous to those in which a real object is perceived. From this point of view, objects are inconceivable without their reference to the experiences in which they are shown: the postulate of a thing in itself, independent of the life of consciousness, is absurd.

 

Thus, in summary, Husserl's Logical Investigations conceives phenomenology as a science that studies the essential structures of experiences and intentional objects, as well as essential relationships between types of experiences and intentional objects. On the other hand, the purpose of phenomenology as proposed in this work would consist of the epistemological clarification of pure logic, which would also include mathematics, based on the fulfillment of the intentional experiences of logical objectivities. Husserl’s later work on phenomenology would take a different direction, not to mention other future phenomenologists. 

 

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Meaning of Transcendental Phenomenology Explained

Edmund Husserl is the founder of what is known as "transcendental phenomenology", which was for him an attempt at a scientific renewal of philosophy. Husserlian phenomenology tries to describing the meaning that the world has for us before all theoretical and speculative conceptions of it.​ This is primarily achieved through phenomenological reduction which goes "back to the things themselves" as Husserl's motto calls. The aim of phenomenology is to thus render things as themselves and describe being as being. 

 

Applying Transcendental Phenomenology

Husserl was against philosophy's reliance on theories and terms that were like "castles in the air". He was especially critical of psychologism. Phenomenological reduction is aimed at clearing the fog and bringing philosophy back to the ground of things themselves. Another central concept of transcendental phenomenology is that of intentionality, which means that things that gain meaning are always intended by our consciousness. An additional fundamental concept is that of evidence or intuition, which is an extension of the concept of perception and which refers to a more original truth than the propositional one: this truth is that of what appears.

Transcendental phenomenology can be considered a radical form of philosophical empiricism. However, it avoids the classic distinction  between empiricism and rationalism by making empirical data a conscious activity.

Husserl's legacy

Husserl thought that his method should be a strict science in the sense or relying only on given known things. He also thought that it should progress as a collective project that unites many thinkers.

However later phenomenologists took different directions. Collective aspirations aside, phenomenology progressed as philosophy usually does through debate and dialectics. Husserl's theory of transcendental phenomenology took various shifts and turns with following thinkers. These, Like Heidegger, sought to make existence itself an intentional object of study, while others, like Levinas, sought to go beyond experience towards realms like infinity. 

 

See also: Introduction to Husserl's Phenomenology

What is Phenomenology

 

Noema and Noesis Explained (Phenomenology)

Noema and Noesis are concepts in phenomenology which relate to the workings of consciousness as "intentionality".  According to Husserl , the noema would be the “intentional” object of acts of consciousness ,or object of thought (and not: the object “in itself”), therefore an object of consciousness as such. 

"Noesis" means the way in which the act of consciousness relates to its object (believing, wanting, hating, loving) while "Noema" means how the object appears through the intentional noetic activity (believed, desired, hated, loved, etc.).

Noema and Noesis

For Husserl thinking is always thinking of something, and that is why everything we perceive has to be perceived as perceived, as an object of intentional perception and not something which is just "out there" in itself. This mode of appearing to our consciousness is what Husserl calls Noema.

Noesis is the "filter" through which our lived experience flows, the modes of meaning things can take. According to Husserl  "It is through noesis, or as noesis, that consciousness becomes consciousness of something, that is to say, encounters an object which confronts it".

The Noema is the meaning assigned to an object of thought by consciousness, or in Husserl's words "the object as meaning constituted by consciousness”.

This means that for Husserl's phenomenology consciousnes is made of two parts which none relate to the objective thing as itself in the world. Since things ara always the product of actvie intentionality, the manner they are intented (Noesis) and the product of that intentionality (Noema) are what constitues them as what they are. 

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Meaning of Constitution in Phenomenology

In philosophical phenomenology, the verb "to constitute" or the word "constitution" is central in describing how things receive their meaning. Constitution in phenomenology always involves a two-fold action of matching a “constituent” with a “constituted”. This is somewhat similar to Saussure's signifier and signified. Constitution is not the act of mentally producing an object in the world, but the act by which a sense of object is formed in the course of experience. This notion of constitution is associated with Husserl's Intentionality.

 

In phenomenology, constitution is manifested as the counterpart of the phenomenological reduction. This means that after with reduce or suspend everything we think we know we are free to examine the manner in which things make themselves available to our consciousness. This means it is also associated with how Husserl viewed appearance and apprehension. The act of constitution can be defined as the return to the actual being of the object, before knowing anything else about it. 

 

Constitution and Constitutive Subjectivity

The phenomenological notion of constitution is tied with that of subjectivity (see Transcendental Subjectivity and the Transcendental I ). Subjectivity is the platform on which things are constituted into objects of perception. In the "natural attitude", this type of constitutive subjectivity or consciousness is unaware of itself in designating things in the "Lifeworld".

For later phenomenologists like Emmanuel Levinas, constitution is something that always involves a relation with another which mediates the relation to things in the world and to subjectivity itself. 

 

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Husserl's Transcendental Consciousness Explained

Husserl's transcendental consciousness is what reamins after the phenomenological reduction and Epoche. This means that after doing away with everything that is not experience based, we are left with a  remainder or a "residue" in Husserl's terms). This thing that cannot be reduced or suspended, but which isn't a phenomenon in a regular sense, is a form of pure or transcendental consciousness. 

The reduction aims to conquer “transcendental consciousness” or pure consciousness, that is to say, a consciousness which constitutes within itself the transcendence which characterizes reality itself . 

See also:Heidegger's "Dasein" compared with Husserl's "transcendental I".

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Consciousness in Husserl's Phenomenology - summary

Consciousness has been a central issue and a key concept in Phenomenology. Husserl gave several accounts of consciousness that were developed throughout his own work and in later Phenomenology. 

The first sense that Husserl gave consciousness is the unity of the same flow of experience. This means that consciousness is what ties together the changing experience of the world. 

In a second sense, it is the internal apperception of one's own experiences grasped in their living selfhood. In a simple definition, this means that consciousness is the awareness of continuously being aware of things. 

Husserl's third definition of consciousness is based on his notion of intentionality. In this variation, consciousness is everything experienced as intentional. For Husserl, everything that has meaning for us is something our consciousness "intends". Things don't just "stand" outside of us but appear from within a cognitive relation. Consciousness is simply the other end of this intentional relationship to experience. 

 

Implications of Husserl's Consciousness 

Consciousness as defined through continued temporal experience makes it something which survives the Phenomenological Reduction and Epoché. This means that it cannot be denied or doubted that there is "something" perceiving experience (this is similar to Descartes' Cogito)

Husserl adds a few distinctions within his understanding to the term. First,  Consciousness  is intertwined with the natural world as both lived consciousness and world consciousness. These spheres are not the same, and we are simultaneously aware of both the world and our perception of the world.  

Second, Husserl distinguishes between intentional consciousness and absolute consciousness; a distinction which is based on the fact that intentional acts flow in time whereas absolute consciousness is an apprehension of time which itself is not in time. Temporal predicates such as 'now', 'before', 'successively', 'simultaneously' do not apply to absolute consciousness itself, but only to immanent temporal objects such as intentional experiences of perception.

 

See also: Husserl on Transcendental Subjectivity and the Transcendental I 

Back to:  Introduction to Husserl's Phenomenology

Husserl on Transcendental Subjectivity and the Transcendental I

Husserl's thoughts on subjectivity changed over time. In Logical Investigations, Husserl refused to think of the "I" as something specific which is distinct from experiences. Meaning that the "I" or subjectivity are defined by their respectability to phenomena. This led him to reduce the “I” to the “unified totality” of experiences. This means that subjectivity is the phenomenon of the unity of consciousness in its intentionality of things. In simpler terms, the "I" for Husserl is that which manifests itself as intending things in the world. Another way to see this is to say that everything in existence is actually subjective since it is only through subjectivity that something can gain meaning. 

 

The I in Ideen

Husserl later developed a notion of a "pure" self. In his example, if we imagine intentionality, that is the active perception of things, as a "ray" emanating from us towards the world, than the "I" is the ray's point of origin. 

This new definition of subjectivity leads Husserl to understand lived experience as a two-way relation between to pole of the object and that of the subject. The only known pole, that on which the "ray" shines, is that of the object. This means that the point of origin, the "pure self", cannot be experienced or described. 

The pure or soon to be Transcendental self is the hidden base of all lived expriences. This type of "ego" according to Husserl survives the phenomenological reduction. Like in Descartes' Meditations, we can doubt everything we perceive, but not the fact that there is something percieved and therefore someone perceiving. 

 

Transcendental subjectivity and Habitus in Cartesian Meditations

In Husserl's Cartesian Meditations, to the concept of ego as the continuity of the self receives additional development. Here subjectivity is a manner of existing through the acts of signifying things as meaningful. Husserl calls this "Habitus" (like Bourdieu would) and defines it as an adaptable mode of being which can make reality its own. 

The self for Husserl is "natural" and therefore also "transcendental". It is natural in being a spontaneous attitude towards the reality, the immediate "lifeworld". There is also the side of the transcendental self as the reduced fact that there is an action of existing and perceiving. In simple world, the natural or "empirical” self experiences phenomena in the life-world, while the transcendental I or self is the fundamental abstract "screen" on which these phenomena are "projected". 

Read more on: Husserl's Natural and Transcendent attitude 

Consciousness in Husserl's Phenomenology

Heidegger's "Dasein" compared with Husserl's "transcendental I".

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Check out: Subject Theory Explained

 

Husserl's Lifeworld Explained

"Lifeworld" (or Life-World, in German: Lebenswelt) is a concept Edmund Husserl borrowed from Wilhelm Dilthey to designate the world as it presents itself to a naive (non-scientific) perception. Husserl reproaches the modern sciences for having dug an impassable gap between themselves (the world of science) and the Lifeworld (see his critique of psychologism). As part of the call "back to things themselves", Husserl wants philosophy back in the world of life, not of speculative thought. 

Therefore, Husserl used the concept of lifeworld to discuss the world surrounding the individual. which is perceived by him subjectively as the real world. The specificity of such a view of the world is the lack of doubts as to its reality. Life-world can be understood as the world of everyday life, everyday experiences and activities of an individual, but also the world of dreams, fantasies and religious experiences.

Husserl describes the lifeworld as "originary” and "unitary". From to pespective of Phenomenology, adressing the lifeworld gives acces to the origin of experience and the original unity of phenomenon and things.

Back to: Introduction to Husserl's Phenomenology

See also:: What is Phenomenology?

Concept of "Thing" in Phenomenology

Husserl is famous for his phenomenological moto of a "return to things themselves", but what does he mean by "thing"?

According to Husserl, anything that "manifests itself in itself" can be a thing. This means a real object, a thought, an horizon, a reference and even nothingness. All this can be the objects or 'things" of phenomenological study.

According to Husserl, nothing we perceive gives itself to us completely. Perception and intentionality only ever see one of the sides of the thing, the others being suggested, so that the thing, which emerges through endless retouching, can never be given to me in an absolute way.

 

"Thing" in later Phenomenology

For Maurice Merleau-Ponty a thing can never be separated from the person who perceives it . However he remarks that even if one cannot conceive of the thing perceived without someone who perceives it, the fact remains that the thing presents itself to the very person who perceives it as a thing “in itself”. But since Husserl observed that the "thing" can never be wholly perceived as "in itself", it follows that "things" are not positive objects. That is, they are always perceived incompletely through horizons we no definite meaning of their own. 

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Natural and Transcendental attitude in Husserl - definition and explanation

In Husserl's phenomenology "natural attitude" means the point of view which is expressed through the "thesis of the world" which corresponds to what man perceives of it, as he experiences it naturally. For Husserl, the world is not posed "out there", it is actively encountered (see intentionality). Natuarl attitude means forming representations, judging, feeling, wanting etc regarding reality. Note that the world of the natural attitude has nothing to do with what is called “vision of the world”, nor with the world of everyday life. What is aimed at is what commands all the possibilities, all the attitudes. 

Each of us live in one and the same world, with variable content, unlimited in time and space. This world, in which I myself am incorporated, is not a simple world of things, but it is at the same time, in the background, a world of values, goods and a practical world. According to Paul Ricœur, in the “natural attitude”, the most constant illusion of the “thesis of the world” is the naive “belief” in the existence “in itself” of this world and that its direct empirical perception would be a priori more certain than reflection. There is no “natural attitude” except by difference and therefore in relation to the transcendental attitude.

Transcendent attitude 

The "transcendental attitude" according to Husserl is determined by opposition to the "psychological attitude" (see Husserl's critique of psychologism). In the psychological attitude the meaning of the solution corresponds to the unveiling of the modes of consciousness in which the object as aimed, that is to say the “object representation” takes place. In the "transcendental attitude", it is a question of an intellection of the subjective operations in which the real object, the real world itself and not the representation of the world is produced in order to become intelligible as a  transcendental "correlate". In other words, the "natural attitude is the whole concept of self-apperceptions of "transcendental subjectivity" which co-belong, it is therefore a constitutive result and as such an integral moment of transcendental life itself.

Read more on Husserl's Transcendental Subjectivity and the Transcendental I 

See also: Introduction to Husserl's Phenomenology

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Husserl's Phenomenological Reduction and Epoché explained

Edmund Husserl held that to study the structure of consciousness, one had to distinguish between an "act of consciousness" and a "phenomenon to which it is directed" (the object to which one refers intentionally, see intentionality). Knowledge about the essence of things and our grasp of them would be possible by "bracketing" all prejudices about the existence of an outside world. This is what Husserl calls Epoché (ἐποχή). 

Husserl called his method "Phenomenological Reduction" or "Eidetic reduction". Epoché achieves this reduction by suspending or bracketing everything we think we know about something, reducing it to its pure appearance as phenomenon. Phenomenological reduction according to Husserl requires a threefold abstinence from subjective attitudes (emotional preconceptions, vocabulary, so-called self-evidence), theoretical presuppositions (formal logic, hypotheses) and finally traditional knowledge (intersubjectivity, convention, dogmas).

 

Reduction back to the things themselves

Husserl's Phenomenological or Eidetic reduction and Epoché lead us to the essence of things as conscious objects (see an explanation of "thing"). Phenomenology regards objects without assumptions or judgments about the actual being or non-being of the contents of consciousness. The world as existing in itself is of no interest to phenomenology, only what we perceive of it can be a basis for meaning.

Phenomenology for Husserl must be able to answer when and how it is possible for consciousness to refer to something. From the phenomenological point of view, the object does not simply exist "outside" nor itself provide clues as to what it is, but becomes a bundle of perceptual and functional aspects mutually implying the idea of ​​a particular object or "type". The reality of objects is not rejected by phenomenology, but is "bracketed" - as a way in which we look at objects, rather than as a property inherent in the nature of the object. In order to better understand the world of appearances and things, phenomenology aims to identify the invariant structures of our ways of perception and thus provides knowledge about the performing consciousness and the structures of these performances.

 

Read more about Husserl's Lifeworld

Back to: Introduction to Husserl's Phenomenology

 

 

Husserl's Intentionality explained simply

In Edmund Husserl's phenomenology Intentionality (Intentionalität) means that consciousness is characterized by the fact that it is always related to something. That is, consciousness is always an intentional act. The simplest definition of intentionality is simply  an "awareness of something" (here you can read what a "thing" is).

Intentionality serves a key function in Husserl's phenomenology as the relationship between an act of consciousness and the outside world. Husserl borrowed the term from Franz Bretano who defines it as a key characteristic of mental phenomena. Every psychic act has content, an object "intended" by consciousness. This applies not just to sensual phenomena, but also to things imagined. Every belief, desire, etc. has an object to which it refers: the believed, the desired and the imagined (think about how imagination always has to imagine something). 

 Husserl gives an example of intentionality with a mannequin in a shop window in front of which we are standing. it can happen that we realize with surprise that it was not a mannequin but a human being. At that moment - and this is the moment when the illusion turns - the meaning of this character changes. The meaning of the object was not in itself (actually mannequin or human) but in the manner in which consciousness actively engaged them. (For a similar example see Freud's Uncanny)

 

Intentionality, noesis and noema

In his "Ideas I" Husserl speaks of noesis and noema as basic moments of the constitution of objects and thus as the limit of what can be said. "Noesis" means how the act of consciousness relates to its object (believe, want, hate, love) and "Noema" means how the object appears through these noetic acts (what is believed, wanted, hated, loved).

 In the mannequin/human example, Husserl would say that in both cases we had a perception of the object. Through a change in our "Noesis", the way we realted to the object, its "Noema" changed and its meaning for us shifted from mannequin to human. 

 

Husserl's adumbration

Another central concept in Husserl's phenomenology whish relates to intentionality is "adumbration" or "shadowing" (Abschattung). Objects are never presented to us as a complete unit, they only show themselves to us in a partial manner. We never have full perspective of what we percieve, and this means for Husserl the total imperceptibility of the object. The prerequisite for perception is therefore the perspective, which at the same time constitutes the hiddenness of the thing and therefore makes the phenomenon of misconception possible in the first place.

 

For background see: Husserl's Critique of Psychologism

For Husserl's next step see: Phenomenological Reduction and Epoché or Transcendental Subjectivity and the Transcendental I 

Back to the beginning: Introduction to Husserl's Phenomenology