Wednesday, September 7, 2022

Husserl on Transcendental Subjectivity and the Transcendental I

Husserl's thoughts on subjectivity changed over time. In Logical Investigations, Husserl refused to think of the "I" as something specific which is distinct from experiences. Meaning that the "I" or subjectivity are defined by their respectability to phenomena. This led him to reduce the “I” to the “unified totality” of experiences. This means that subjectivity is the phenomenon of the unity of consciousness in its intentionality of things. In simpler terms, the "I" for Husserl is that which manifests itself as intending things in the world. Another way to see this is to say that everything in existence is actually subjective since it is only through subjectivity that something can gain meaning. 

 

The I in Ideen

Husserl later developed a notion of a "pure" self. In his example, if we imagine intentionality, that is the active perception of things, as a "ray" emanating from us towards the world, than the "I" is the ray's point of origin. 

This new definition of subjectivity leads Husserl to understand lived experience as a two-way relation between to pole of the object and that of the subject. The only known pole, that on which the "ray" shines, is that of the object. This means that the point of origin, the "pure self", cannot be experienced or described. 

The pure or soon to be Transcendental self is the hidden base of all lived expriences. This type of "ego" according to Husserl survives the phenomenological reduction. Like in Descartes' Meditations, we can doubt everything we perceive, but not the fact that there is something percieved and therefore someone perceiving. 

 

Transcendental subjectivity and Habitus in Cartesian Meditations

In Husserl's Cartesian Meditations, to the concept of ego as the continuity of the self receives additional development. Here subjectivity is a manner of existing through the acts of signifying things as meaningful. Husserl calls this "Habitus" (like Bourdieu would) and defines it as an adaptable mode of being which can make reality its own. 

The self for Husserl is "natural" and therefore also "transcendental". It is natural in being a spontaneous attitude towards the reality, the immediate "lifeworld". There is also the side of the transcendental self as the reduced fact that there is an action of existing and perceiving. In simple world, the natural or "empirical” self experiences phenomena in the life-world, while the transcendental I or self is the fundamental abstract "screen" on which these phenomena are "projected". 


Read more on: Husserl's Natural and Transcendent attitude 

Consciousness in Husserl's Phenomenology

Heidegger's "Dasein" compared with Husserl's "transcendental I".

Back to:  Introduction to Husserl's Phenomenology

Check out: Subject Theory Explained