In philosophical phenomenology, the verb
"to constitute" or the word "constitution" is central in describing
how things receive their meaning. Constitution
in phenomenology always involves a two-fold action of matching
a “constituent” with a “constituted”. This is somewhat similar to Saussure's signifier and signified. Constitution
is not the act of mentally producing an object in the world, but the act by
which a sense of object is formed in the course of experience. This notion of constitution
is associated with Husserl's Intentionality.
In phenomenology, constitution is manifested as
the counterpart of the phenomenological reduction. This means that after with
reduce or suspend everything we think we know we are free to examine the manner
in which things make themselves available to our consciousness. This means it is also associated
with how Husserl viewed appearance and apprehension. The act of constitution
can be defined as the return to the actual being of the object, before knowing
anything else about it.
Constitution
and Constitutive Subjectivity
The phenomenological notion of constitution is
tied with that of subjectivity (see Transcendental Subjectivity and the Transcendental I ).
Subjectivity is the platform on which things are constituted into objects of
perception. In the "natural attitude", this type of constitutive
subjectivity or consciousness is unaware of itself in designating things in the
"Lifeworld".
For later phenomenologists like Emmanuel
Levinas, constitution is something that always involves a relation with another
which mediates the relation to things in the world and to subjectivity
itself.
Back to: What is Phenomenology? or to Things Themselves: Easy Intro to Husserl's Phenomenology
