Summary: Anarchy is what states make of it / Alexander Wendt

- Wendt holds in  ‘Anarchy is what states make of it’ that international politics is socially constructed

-states have a say in what anarchy means: does not necessarily mean that states always distrust one another, but states construct the relationship they have with one another

- identity results in what states find important

à constructivism = the idea that everything is a social construction where focus lies on interest, identity, and meaning

However, it does not mean that we can make up random things à it is true that relations and what states want is not a given and is constructed by interaction, BUT: that does not mean that states are not bound by certain cultures that define what they want.

MAIN POINT:

We should not necessarily treat interests and identity as given. Although Wendt agrees with a statist view, he argues that an important field of research should treat state interests and identity as the dependent variable. Wendt concedes that there are those who study how first- and second-image factors affect state identity and interests; he wants us to study how anarchy affects state identities and interests.

Realism's shortcoming is its failure to do this (although Wendt agrees that realist game theory is entirely appropriate in situations where we can assume that identities are constant, at least in the short term). Neoliberalism's failure is that it has sought to explain cooperation by focusing on process, but it has not sufficiently accounted for systemic variables. Constructivism's failure is that it gets too bogged down in epistemological debates without looking enough at how identities are formed in practice.

In short, we need a combination of neoliberalism and constructivism that will study how the system affects state identities and interests.

FROM HANDOUT:

• Wendt argues for a constructivist approach to the concept of self-help. He argues that international institutions (here the institution is self-help) can change state identities and interests.
• He argues that the concept of self-help as defined by realists (and mainly by Waltz) originates from the interaction of the units in the system, and not from anarchy. This conception conflicts with the structural, deterministic arguments that realists advance in which anarchy is the key explanatory variable that drives interactions.
• Wendt says that states interact with each other and, based on the results of that interaction, can become characterized by self-help, but this result does not necessarily need to follow. Whatever is observed, self-help or not, is defined by process, not structure.
• Wendt says that neorealism and neoliberalism cannot account for changes in the system, but norms-based constructivisim can (threats are socially constructed). A major difficulty in this piece is the issue of how states behave in the first period before they have any priors.

SOME VARIABLES:

This article explores "three ways in which identities and interests are transformed under anarchy [Y]: by the institution of sovereignty [X1], by an evolution of cooperation [X2], and by intentional efforts to transform egoistic identities into collective identities [X3]." I gather that Wendt doesn't intend for these three variables to tell us everything that anarchy does to identity. Instead, he is looking at three different things that can happen under anarchy to affect identity. The strong implication is that there is more to it, and we need to theorize about it.

Before getting into that, Wendt argues that the system does not create self-help idendities. An anarchic system is only a permissive cause of such an identity. He suggests one possible sufficient cause of self-help identities. If a predatory state emerged, it would force other states to respond. But even this depends on the prior identity; if the predatory state emerges into a system that already has a strong collective security identity, then it would be defeated without changing the dominant identity. So, think NATO. Realism would predict that, with the Soviet threat gone, the alliance will break up as states become suspicious of one another. But Wendt would seem to suggest that a collective identity can continue.

After making all this argument as background (and using up two-thirds of his pages), he then turns to the three independent variables that can effect a change in state identities and interests under anarchy.

X1: Sovereignty. Sovereignty is a norm, and it has been self-enforcing so far (look what happened to Hitler and Napoleon when they went against it). It has changed our interests, so that we think we need to defend territorial boundaries (even when letting a piece of territory go might be better for our security).

X2: Evolution of cooperation: Europe's long experience with cooperation during the cold war may have fundamentally changed its identity, creating a "European" identity that will persist despite the collapse of the Soviet threat and the renewed vigor of Germany.

X3: Intentional efforts to egoistic identities into collective identities: Gorbachev, recognizing that the USSR was losing the security battle, sought instead to proactively change its identity--and the identity of its adversary--into a cooperative identity. He did this by sending signals that he had changed (e.g. developing weapons that are only useful for defense) and by treating the West as the it, too, had changed.

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Summary: Hegemony, Gramsci and International relations / RW Cox

There are two main stands leading to the Gramscian idea of hegemony:

1. The third international concerning the strategy of Bolsheviks and the creation of a socialist state.

2. the writings from Machiavelli.

He is looking for a way of creating Hegemony and he wants to mention conditions. He enlarges the definition of the state. He says that it is possible that leaders hand out power to other civil instances, as long as they recognize the hegemony. So Gramsci says that the notion of the state would also have to include the underpinnings of the political structure in civil society. Gramsci thought of this in concrete historical terms. All the institutions that form people are consistent with the hegemonic order.

Gramsci comes to the conclusion that western societies differ fundamentally from Russian societies. Because of their intern organisation, it was hard for communists to turn over the state to with a revolutionary approach. He states that a war of movement is not the way to deal with the western societies, a war of position is better. This means you slowly build up the strength of the social foundation of a new state. In western Europe, the struggle had to be won in civil society before an assault on the state could achieve success. The difficulty about this is the fact that you have to create a counter hegemony with all new institutions and intellectual resources.

Gramsci says there are two kinds of societies; on has undergone a social revolution and worked out fully its consequences in new modes of production and social relations. The other kind were societies which had so to speak imported or had trust upon them aspects of a new order created abroad, without the old being replaced. In these societies, there was no active hegemony because the opposing forces did not succeed in creating a revolution. This created passive revolution conditions.

There are some typical accompaniments to passive revolution:

1. Ceasarism. A strong man intervenes to resolve the stalemate between equal and opposed social forces. There are progressive (when strong rules presides over a more orderly development of a new state) and reactionary (when it stabilises existing power).

2. transformismo. The widest possible coalition of interests. It is about cooperation between subaltern social groups.

We use passive revolution to show that there is no active hegemony because no dominant class has been able to establish a hegemony in Gramsci’s sense of term.

Gramsci states that state and society together constituted a solid structure strong enough to replace the first. Such a structure is a historic bloc. Ideas and material are always relating and mutually influencing each other. An historic bloc cannot exist without a hegemonic social class. A new bloc can occur when a sub group brings his ideas to the stage in a society and overrules the others. In western societies, this will be done by a war of position.

In the creation of historic blocs, three levels of consciousness are separated: economic-cooperative, solidarity of class consciousness and the hegemonic.

Hegemony and international relations.

The state remains for Gramsci the basic entity in international relations and the place where social conflicts take place, the place also, therefore where hegemonies of social classes can be built. The emergence of new worker led blocs at the national level would, in this line of reasoning, precede any basic restructuring of international relations. States that are powerful, have undergone a profound social and economic revolution and have most worked out the consequences of this revolution in the form of social relations.

Hegemony and world order.

It would appear that, historically, to become hegemonic, a state would have to found and protect a world order which is universal in its conception. The hegemonic concept of world order is founded not only upon the regulation of inter-state conflict but also upon a globally conceived civil society, a mode of production of global extent which brings about links among social classes of the countries encompassed by it. A hegemon can encompass more peripheral countries in it by a passive revolution. in the world hegemonic model, hegemony is more intense and consistent at the core and more contradicting at the periphery. Hegemony is an order with world economy with a dominant of production  which penetrates into all countries. It also encompasses social relationships. You can describe it as social, political and economic structure.

Mechanisms of hegemony: IOs.

IOs form the process through which a hegemon can develop its ideology in to the world. Features that express IOs and their hegemonic role are:

1. They embody the rules which facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world order.

2. They are themselves the product of hegemonic world order. 

3. They ideologically legitimate the norms of the world order. 

4. They co-opt the elites from peripheral countries

5. They absorb counter hegemonic ideas.

International institutions are usually formed by the hegemonic state and its rules.

The prospects for Counter-Hegemony. 

world orders are grounded in social relations. Gramsci’s analysis of Italy: only a war of position can, in the long run, bring about structural changes, and a war of position involves building up the socio political base for change through the creation of new historic blocs. This is the core of changing the world. 

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Summary: The Demand for International Regimes / Robert Keohane

The article ‘The Demand for International Regimes’ by Robert Heohane  tries to improve our understanding of international order trough interpretation of international regime- formation that relies on rational-choice analysis in the utilitarian social contract tradition. 5 parts: 1. systemic constraint-choice analysis; 2. context + functions of international regimes; 3. theory of the demand for international regimes; 4. issues of closure and communication; 5. control-oriented regimes will be supplemented by insurance regimes

à why should self-interested actors in world politics seek to establish international regimes through mutual agreement? 

Theory of hegemonic stability: concentration of power in one dominant state makes the development of strong regimes easier

BUT: - this theory fails to explain lags between changes in power structures + international regimes

          - fails to explain why international regimes are much more extensive than earlier

1. Systematic constraint-choice analysis: virtues + limitations

- systemic theory: changes in outcomes are explained on basis of changes in the system itself, not on the actor: the actor is not a variable, but is seen to respond rationally to constraints + incentives.

à thus, decisions about creating/joining an international regime are affected by system-level changes. 

-use of rational choice theory (constraint-choice theory) implies that we must view decisions involving international regimes as ‘voluntarily’

HOWEVER: we know that world politics is something in which power is often exercised, and often with great inequality à how do international regimes come into being voluntary? 

 1. Imposition of constraints: dictated by environmental factors + powerful actors. 

‘imposed regime’ = regime agreed upon within constraints that are mandated by powerful actors. 

à actor choices will be constrained in a way that allows preferences of more powerful actors having greater weight. 

- constraint-choice analysis captures non-hierarchical nature of world politics without ignoring the role played by power + ineguality

We must, when looking at international regimes, that states are utility-maximizers, and rational. 

à in general: states join those regimes where benefits outweigh the costs

- the most important function of a regime (= contract/quasi-agreement) is to establish mutual expectations about other’s behaviour.

- changes in extent + strength of international regimes can be explained by reference to changes in characteristic of the international system (where actors make choices) or of regimes themselves (about which choices are made)

QUESTION: why should disadvantaged actors join regimes?

2. Context and functions of international regimes

- function of an international regime is to facilitate the making of mutually beneficial agreements.

- the actors in this model operate within a self-help system (Waltz), which mean that the actors cannot call higher authority to solve their problems or provide protection. 

Keohane: the theory of hegemonic stability focuses on the supply-side of international regimes: hegemonic international systems should be characterised by levels of public goods production higher than in fragmented systemà this ignores the demand side of international regimes: why should governments desire to institute international regimes? How much are they willing to contribute to keep them?

- Context: agreements in regime context are stronger than ad hoc agreements (formed for one specific purpose) 

                à Keohane compares again to economy: market failure occurs when the outcomes of the market are sub-optional:  agreements that would be beneficial to all parties are not made. 

                à International regimes help to reduce the barriers for optimal agreements (market failure).

Public goods give rise to the demand for international regimes which can improve problems of transactions costs and information imperfections that obstruct effective decentralized responses to problems of providing public goods.

3. Elements of a theory of the demand for international regimes

There is an important distinction between the demand regimes and demand for ad hoc agreements: 

- regimes facilitate the making of substantive agreements by providing a framework of rules, norms, priniciples, and procedures of for negotiation. 

à the demand for AGREEMENTS is exogenous: may be influenced by many factors (especially by the perceptions that leaders have about their interests in agreement or non-agreements. 

à international regimes are demanded when they make possible agreements yielding net benefits that would not be possible on ad hoc basis agreements. 

Ronald Coase expresses in his theory: Coase Theorem, three ways in which international regimes can help the agreements made:

a) legal framework establishing liability for actions

b) perfect information

c) zero transaction costs.

à demand for international regimes is high when costs are lower than benefits, and if costs of ad hoc agreements are higher than the regime agreements. When the isse-density is low, ad hoc agreements are more attractive, since they are about a specific area. But when the issue-density is high, and thus the interdependence higher, the demand for international regimes will grow. 

There are three specific problems that give rise to the demand for international regimes:

1) asymmetric information: expecting that the resulting bargains will be unfair. ‘outsiders’ (states who have less information about the situation than others), will not want to make agreements

2) moral hazard: agreements may sometimes alter incentives with result that cooperative behaviour is discouraged. (Insurance companies have this all the time, property insurance makes people less careful with their propert à increase the risk of loss)

3) deception and irresponsibility: some actors may enter an agreement without intention of fulfilling, or others can be irresponsible and make commitments they are not able to fulfill.

4. Information, openness, and communication in international regimes

International regimes can help to increase quantity and quality of communication and to encourage openness: regimes do this by:

- linking issuesà important way of dealing with deception: deception is less profitable in an agreement involving many issues (state who is carrying out deception, or ‘cheating’ will be closely monitored by other states)  

- increase quantity + quality of communication: lighten the information problems.

5. Coping with uncertainties: insurance regimes

- participating in international cooperation is always risky: if others fail to cooperate, the cooperating states may suffer.

- governments are always comparing the risks they would run from lack of regulation of issue-areas, with the risks of entering an international regime 

- Most international regimes are control-oriented regimes: 

àmembers maintain some degree of control over each other’s behaviour: necessary condition for this type of regime is that the benefits of membership outweigh the costs. 

à they are based on the theory of hegemonic stability

à seek to ensure 2 kinds of regularity: 

1. internal: refers to orderly patterns of behaviour among members in the regime.

2. environmental: refers to behaviour between member-states and outsiders. (e.g. military alliances is extreme case of attempting environmental control) 

HOWEVER: this is not the only type of regime that exists:

Insurance Regime: is established voluntarily by common benefit, but weaker because no one enforces it.

6. Conclusion

- INTERNATIONAL REGIMES CAN BE INTERPRETED AS DEVICES TO FACILITATE AGREEMENTS, BY PROVIDING RULES, NORMS, PRINCIPLES, AND PROCEDURES THAT HELP ACTORS TO OVERCOME BARRIERS TO AGREEMENT IDENTIFIED BY ECONOMIC THEORY OF MARKET FAILURE

- DEMAND-SIDE OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: 

a) INCREASED ISSUE DENSITY WILL LEAD TO INCREASED DEMAND FOR INTERNATIONAL REGIMES

b) DEMAND FOR INTERNATIONAL REGIMES WILL BE PART OF A FUNCTION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE REGIMES THEMSELVES IN DEVELOPING NORMS OF GENERALIZED COMMINMENT AND IN PROVIDING HIGH-QUALITY INFORMATION TO POLICY-MAKERS. 

- CONSTRAINT-CHOICE THEORY HELPS US HOW TRANS-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS WORK + CHANGE. 

- HEGEMONY IS NOT A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR STABLE INTERNATIONAL REGIMES. 

see also: International Institutions: Two Approaches / Robert Keohane

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Summary: The origins of war in Neorealist theory / Kenneth Waltz

According to Kenneth Waltz in his "The origins of war in Neorealist theory theory cannot explain the accidental or account for unexpected events; it deals in regularities and repetitions and is possible when these can be identified. A theory indicates that some factors are more important than others and those define the relations around them.

Neorealism maintains, while defining a theory, the tenets of realpolitik, but is sees different causes, ends and effets. Where realists view power as an end, neorealists see it as possibly useful means. They say that in ultimate situations, when wars are threatening for example, states choose for security over power. This is an important revision.

Also important is the shift in causal relations. Realism thinks as causes moving in only one direction, from the interaction of individuals and states to the outcomes that their acts and interactions produce. Morgenthau acknowledges that power arises when people want things, not because it is in their evil human nature.

Neorealism contends that international politics can understood only if the effects of structure are added to the unit-level explanations of traditional realism. By emphasizing how structures affect actions and outcomes, neorealism rejects the assumption that man’s innate lust for power constitutes a sufficient cause of war in the absence of any other. It reconceives the causal link interacting units and international outcomes.

To compose a theory: states are unitary actors wanting at least to survive, and are taken to be the system’s constituent units. The essential structural quality of the system is anarchy. It deals with an international focus (black box thinking). Systems theories are theories that explain how the organization of a realm acts as a constraining and disposing force on the interacting units within it. We can predict how units will act within the system.

System theories explain why different units behave similarly and, despite their variations, produce outcomes within expected ranges. Conversely, theories at the unit level tell us why different units behave differently despite their similar placement in a system.

Neorealism states that within an anarchy, states need to provide their own security to protect themselves from threats. The security dilemma is a good example of how this goes. Wars occur. This depends on situations and characteristics of states. Not because states want to have war.

Multipolar vs. bipolar.

Multipolar.

-alliances are made and allies need to appeal to the other allies.

- alliances are made because there is some common interest.

-       Interest is most of the time fear of the others.

-       Competing blocks. One state can not let his weaker ally be destroyed (WOI).

-       In alliances among equals, the defection of one member threatens the security of the others.

-       Dangers are diffused, responsibilities unclear and definitions of vital interests are easily obscured.

Bipolar.

-       More flexibility of strategy and greater freedom of decision

-       Alliance leaders can design strategies in their own interests.

-       The only have to cope with the other.

-       Never doubt about who brings danger to who.

-       Loss for one, is gain for the other.

-       Action leads to reaction.

-       Miscalculation is greater evil because it can lead to worse unfolding events that threatens the status quo.

-       Economies are less interdependent.

Multipolar: diffusion of dangers, interdependence of partners and confusion of responses.

Bipolar: self dependence, clarity of dangers, certainty about who has to face them.

Another great force in a bipolar world is of course nuclear weapons. War becomes less likely because the costs are not less than the benefits of it. The accumulation of power by conquest is no longer possible because of nuclear weapons. With states wanting to have security, a war won’t happen with nuclear weapons. Since the US and Russia can encounter a second strike attack. War still happens, but involvement of states with nuclear weapons is less likely.

In a bipolar world each of the two great powers is bound to focus its fears on the others, to distrust its motives and to impute offensive intentions to defensive measures. The proper question is what started the cold war, not who. Cold war remained cold because of nuclear weapons and this creates an uneasy peace. 

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Summary: Can we think systematically about ethics and statecraft / Welch

Main point of  Welch's  "Can we think systematically about ethics and statecraft " is: identify the ‘moral standards’ with which we can criticize the actions of leaders and politics, by asking the following question: can we think systematically about ethics and statecraft? And if so, how?

- moral theory: helps us think systematically about ethical matters

à provides guides for resolving tensions + instructs us how to give answers to difficult moral problems

à can be seen in 2 ways:

1. Moral theory as a means of disciplining our moral judgements: we should treat moral theory as our guide: moral judgements are thus subservient to moral theory.

2. Moral theory as subservient to moral judgements

à Rawls: moral theory is an attempt to describe our moral capacity à we will seek to adjust our moral principles so that they make sense of our powerful moral convictions. BUT: whose moral sense do we seek to articulate??

Ethical traditions

- we can also reason in accordance with ethical traditions like the natural law tradition or the Christian tradition

à they permit good analysis of often very complex moral issues 

HOWEVER: - conclusions reached by only reasoning with a particular ethical tradition can only be paired with adherents to that ethical tradition: old ethical traditions might be unable to reason systematically about other cases with each other. 

                      - modern societies often contain a variety of competing ethical tradition: political leaders must therefore confront the question of which of those traditions to follow à BUT: no ethical tradition can answer which tradition to follow. 

- We are left with:

1. seek alternative basis for rendering systematic ethical judgements

2. Give up all hope and live with ethical discourse or attempt to expunge ethical discourse from international affairs: BUT: this does not find the problem and is impossible (human beings see the world through a moral lense) 

à option 1 is preferable

Ethical Judgement

- Whether we accept claims on international affairs is solely a function of justification

Rawls: justification is argument addressed to those who disagree, or to ourselves when we are of two minds (..) seeks to convince of the reasonableness of the principles upon which our claims and judgements are founded

Justification

- is always addressed to a particular audience for a particular reason

- will always fail unless resting on claims or principles that the audience already accepts

Dilemma:

à the more we restrict the group whose assent we require, the more likely radical disagreements are about leaders’ moral choices from people and groups who proceed from incommensurable ethical premises. 

à the less we restrict the group whose assent we require, the more difficult it will be justifying our actions + policies, and the weaker our ethical foundations are.

QUESTION: what is the appropriate audience for an ethical justification of state action?

                - Universalism (Kant, liberals): all rational autonomous moral agents must assent (no restricted groups)

                - Islam: requires only the assent of the faithful

Conclusion: turning to particular traditions can’t help us

- It is also not enough to say that leaders should stick to their own principles in order to act ethically in international affairs (look at Hitler)

- if we are to implement ethical standards on society of states, states would only preach own perspective. 

- If we are to implement universal ethical standards, they would have to be very weak standards, seeing as there are so many different ethical views.

Conventionalism as a long-term alternative to foundationalism

Foundationalism: deduced from basic beliefs, can be used justify certain beliefs

Conventionalism: grounded on societal agreement rather than external belief à search for minimal standards of ethical conduct in international affairs. 

à is based on conventionalist moral theory: a theory based on a fact of agreement between two or more parties. Conventionalism:

                1. has authorities only to those who regard it has authoritative. 

                BUT: is it moral or bargaining? E.g. a developing country can agree with the authority, but can disagree with the costs

                2. its justification is straightforward: common denominator, premises accepted by audience

                BUT: it is unknown how or when parties agree. 

                3. It feats neatly with prevailing norms of state sovereignty: if states are unwilling to consent to something, they do not have to

                4. is attractive regardless of purpose of moral theory: there is a fixed moral compass, we can more easily discipline disagreeing judgements + we have the ability to map moral judgements in IR.

 Conventionalism has contributed to the grow of international regimes (contractual or consensual arrangements that fix norms + standards of behaviour for their members in specific issue areas) 

à problem: - states can leave and enter international regimes

                         - states can ‘agree’ to enter international regimes out of anxiety. 

HOWEVER: Welch states that this is not enough to forget about the conventionalist theory:

- great powers must learn to forebear coercing weaker states to ‘agree’ out of anxiety: must stop behave like great powers. Even though this may be too much to ask, the willingness of the great powers to not abuse their position is useful to see how much they are willing to promote moral order 

à e.g. pluralistic security communities North Atlantic, Scandinavia, Australia show that when larger states are willing to cultivate social aspects of international society (interacting with smaller powers on terms of mutual concern) all parties benefit.

In difficult moral cases however, we must address our existing moral commitments ßàgoes against conventionalism.

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Summary: International Institutions: Two Approaches / Robert Keohane

To understand the conditions under which cooperation can take place, one must understand how international institutions operate and how they come into being. All cooperation take place in somehow an institutional way. Cooperation is a contested term, the way Keohane uses it, it is distinguished from discord and harmony. Cooperation requires that the actions of separate individuals or organizations must be brought in conformity with each other.

The impact of cooperation can be measured by looking at the difference between the impact of the outcome of it and the impact of outcome when there would be no cooperation. Cooperation knows different views: rationalistic and reflectivist. The chief argument of the article is as follow:

Students of international relations should direct their attention to the relative merits of two those approaches. Until we understand the strengths and weaknesses of both, we will be unable to design research strategies that are sufficiently multifaceted to encompass our subject-matter, and our empirical work will suffer accordingly.

The article and this summary will be build as follow:

1. Definitions of international institutions.

2. Rationalist approach

3. Reflective approach.

4. Conclusion.

1.       Definitions. 

after mentioning different forms of institutions, Keohane mentions the following: ‘’I will focus on institutions that can be identified as related complexes of rules and norms, identifiable in time and space.’’

He means that we have to look at institutions that are auctioning particular activity and have general norms that can be attached to any number of rule complexes. In this way, he can focus on specific institutions and on practices. Specific institutions can be defined in terms of their rules. Those have to be durable and must prescribe behavioural roles for actors that are constrained by it. 

He calls it summary rules. They summarize the past and predict what will happen in the future. Those rules are comprehended by practices: the mark of a practice that being taught how to engage in it involves being instructed in the rules that define it, and that appeal is made to those rules to correct the behaviour of those engaged in it. Those engaged, should not oppose to these, because that will be punished (Rawls). According to Rawls, sovereignty is a practice because it contains a set of rules that define it and that can be used to correct states’ behaviour.

2.       Rationalist.

assumption: scarcity and competition as well as rationality from the actors.

It is the combination of potential value and the difficulty of making them that renders international regimes significant. The view them as patterns of cost. If transaction costs (transferring info about cooperation partner) are negligible, it won’t be necessary to create new institutions to facilitate mutually beneficial exchange. According to this theory, transaction costs are never negligible, so one should expect institutions when the costs of communication, monitoring and enforcement are relatively low compared to benefits generated from it. They can’t be politically neutral though.

It does not account though why they occur in only some fields. There are hypotheses though: some are not created because the benefits are not high enough. Hegemony is a necessary condition. The slowing away of a hegemon can create a reason for the diminishing of an institution.

So it does account how they occur and when, but why and what kinds will and won’t develop. It is good at posing questions, but not in giving answers. Rationalism also needs to extend its vision on history. To overview the history, you can conclude why some occurred. Theories of path-dependence in economics might account for reasons why they occur. Some organisations still exist (GATT), though they are not efficient. Why? Sunk costs might able to remain them or considerations of power are involved over the years. This shows the importance of history.

3.       Reflectivist.

This focusses on processes and sociological effects. It is not only about human beings shaping them, it is also about changing environments. The critique on rationalist comes back here by saying that a lack of focus on history is filled up by reflectivist approaches. Sociological changes are also important and institutions are not only shaped from the outside. There is lack of consideration in context. Learning and consciousness should also be taken into account.

Keohane mentions the criticism on rationalist:

- the assumption of equilibrium is often misleading

-       Rationalists account better for strange in strength than in change of cultural values.

-       It does not take into account social processes of reflection and learning.

-       It has little to say about the evolution of practices and its origins.

Though, Keohane argues that these critiques are not devastating. No social science is complete and this is a perfect explanatory framework. Reflective is not that good since it has no clear cut data to use. Neither does pay attention to domestic politics.

4.       Conclusions.

- International institutions are important, but without cooperation we are lost.

-. Rationalistic approach needs to be contextualized historically, they do need an explanation that is not embedded in practices that are not entirely explicable through rationalistic analysis.

- reflective needs to develop own theories instead of omitting rationalistic theories.

- we hope for a synthesis between both.

*ATTENTION: KEOHANE PRESENTS IT LIKE HE IS EVALUATING BOTH APPROACHES, BUT IS CLEARLY MORE FOND OF RATIONAL APPROACH ABOVE REFLECTIVE. THIS IS BECAUSE OF LACK OF DATA USE IN REFLECTIVE APPROACH*  

see also: The Demand for International Regimes / Robert Keohane

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Article Summaries in Political Science

Here you can find a list of links to summaries of articles in political science:

International Institutions: Two Approaches / Robert Keohane
The Demand for International Regimes / Robert Keohane
Can we think systematically about ethics and statecraft / Welch
The origins of war in Neorealist theory / Kenneth Waltz 
Hegemony, Gramsci and International relations / RW Cox
Anarchy is what states make of it / Alexander Wendt


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