The article
‘The Demand
for International Regimes’ by Robert Heohane tries
to improve our understanding of international order trough interpretation of
international regime- formation that relies on rational-choice analysis in the
utilitarian social contract tradition. 5 parts: 1. systemic constraint-choice
analysis; 2. context + functions of international regimes; 3. theory of the
demand for international regimes; 4. issues of closure and communication; 5.
control-oriented regimes will be supplemented by insurance regimes
à why
should self-interested actors in world politics seek to establish international
regimes through mutual agreement?
Theory of hegemonic
stability: concentration of power in one dominant state makes the
development of strong regimes easier
BUT: - this theory fails to explain lags between changes in power structures +
international regimes
- fails to explain why
international regimes are much more extensive than earlier
1.
Systematic constraint-choice analysis: virtues + limitations
- systemic theory: changes in outcomes are explained on basis of changes in the
system itself, not on the actor: the actor is not a variable, but is seen to
respond rationally to constraints + incentives.
à
thus, decisions about creating/joining an international regime are affected by
system-level changes.
-use of rational choice theory (constraint-choice theory) implies that we must view decisions
involving international regimes as ‘voluntarily’
HOWEVER: we know that world politics is something in which power is often
exercised, and often with great inequality à how do international regimes come
into being voluntary?
1. Imposition
of constraints: dictated by environmental factors + powerful actors.
‘imposed regime’ = regime agreed upon within constraints that are mandated by
powerful actors.
à
actor choices will be constrained in a way that allows preferences of more
powerful actors having greater weight.
- constraint-choice analysis captures non-hierarchical nature of world politics
without ignoring the role played by power + ineguality
We must, when looking at international regimes, that states are
utility-maximizers, and rational.
à in
general: states join those regimes where benefits outweigh the costs
- the most important function of a regime (= contract/quasi-agreement) is to
establish mutual expectations about other’s behaviour.
- changes in extent + strength of international regimes can be explained by
reference to changes in characteristic of the international system (where
actors make choices) or of regimes themselves (about which choices are made)
QUESTION: why should disadvantaged actors join regimes?
2. Context
and functions of international regimes
- function of an
international regime is to facilitate the making of mutually beneficial
agreements.
- the actors in this model operate within a self-help system (Waltz), which
mean that the actors cannot call higher authority to solve their problems or
provide protection.
Keohane: the theory of hegemonic stability focuses on the supply-side of
international regimes: hegemonic international systems should be characterised
by levels of public goods production higher than in fragmented systemà this ignores the demand side of
international regimes: why should governments desire to institute international
regimes? How much are they willing to contribute to keep them?
- Context: agreements in regime context are stronger than ad hoc agreements
(formed for one specific purpose)
à Keohane compares again to economy:
market failure occurs when the outcomes of the market are sub-optional: agreements that would be beneficial to all
parties are not made.
à International regimes help to
reduce the barriers for optimal agreements (market failure).
Public
goods give rise to the demand for international regimes which can improve
problems of transactions costs and information imperfections that obstruct
effective decentralized responses to problems of providing public goods.
3.
Elements of a theory of the demand for international regimes
There is an
important distinction between the demand regimes and demand for ad hoc
agreements:
- regimes facilitate the making of substantive agreements by providing a
framework of rules, norms, priniciples, and procedures of for negotiation.
à the
demand for AGREEMENTS is exogenous: may be influenced by many factors
(especially by the perceptions that leaders have about their interests in
agreement or non-agreements.
à
international regimes are demanded when they make possible agreements yielding
net benefits that would not be possible on ad hoc basis agreements.
Ronald Coase expresses in his theory: Coase Theorem, three ways in which
international regimes can help the agreements made:
a) legal framework establishing liability for actions
b) perfect information
c) zero transaction costs.
à
demand for international regimes is high when costs are lower than benefits,
and if costs of ad hoc agreements are higher than the regime agreements. When
the isse-density is low, ad hoc agreements are more attractive, since they are
about a specific area. But when the issue-density is high, and thus the
interdependence higher, the demand for international regimes will grow.
There are three specific problems that give rise to the demand for
international regimes:
1) asymmetric information: expecting that the resulting bargains will be
unfair. ‘outsiders’ (states who have less information about the situation than
others), will not want to make agreements
2) moral hazard: agreements may sometimes alter incentives with result that
cooperative behaviour is discouraged. (Insurance companies have this all the
time, property insurance makes people less careful with their propert à increase the risk of loss)
3) deception and irresponsibility: some actors may enter an agreement without
intention of fulfilling, or others can be irresponsible and make commitments
they are not able to fulfill.
4.
Information, openness, and communication in international regimes
International
regimes can help to increase quantity and quality of communication and to
encourage openness: regimes do this by:
- linking issuesà important way of dealing with deception:
deception is less profitable in an agreement involving many issues (state who
is carrying out deception, or ‘cheating’ will be closely monitored by other
states)
- increase quantity + quality of communication: lighten the information
problems.
5. Coping
with uncertainties: insurance regimes
- participating in
international cooperation is always risky: if others fail to cooperate, the
cooperating states may suffer.
- governments are always comparing the risks they would run from lack of
regulation of issue-areas, with the risks of entering an international regime
- Most international regimes are control-oriented regimes:
àmembers
maintain some degree of control over each other’s behaviour: necessary
condition for this type of regime is that the benefits of membership outweigh
the costs.
à
they are based on the theory of hegemonic stability
à
seek to ensure 2 kinds of regularity:
1. internal: refers to orderly patterns of behaviour among members in the regime.
2. environmental: refers to behaviour between member-states and outsiders.
(e.g. military alliances is extreme case of attempting environmental control)
HOWEVER: this is not the only type of regime that exists:
Insurance Regime: is established voluntarily by common benefit, but weaker
because no one enforces it.
6.
Conclusion
- INTERNATIONAL
REGIMES CAN BE INTERPRETED AS DEVICES TO FACILITATE AGREEMENTS, BY PROVIDING
RULES, NORMS, PRINCIPLES, AND PROCEDURES THAT HELP ACTORS TO OVERCOME BARRIERS
TO AGREEMENT IDENTIFIED BY ECONOMIC THEORY OF MARKET FAILURE
- DEMAND-SIDE OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES:
a) INCREASED ISSUE DENSITY WILL LEAD TO INCREASED DEMAND FOR INTERNATIONAL
REGIMES
b) DEMAND FOR INTERNATIONAL REGIMES WILL BE PART OF A FUNCTION OF THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE REGIMES THEMSELVES IN DEVELOPING NORMS OF GENERALIZED
COMMINMENT AND IN PROVIDING HIGH-QUALITY INFORMATION TO POLICY-MAKERS.
- CONSTRAINT-CHOICE THEORY HELPS US HOW TRANS-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS WORK +
CHANGE.
- HEGEMONY IS NOT A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR STABLE INTERNATIONAL REGIMES.
