Georges Sorel and the Politics of Myth and Violence

Georges Sorel (1847–1922) remains one of the most unsettling intellectual figures of the early 20th century. While many of his contemporaries sought rational order, truth, or social harmony, Sorel insisted on something more volatile: the power of collective imagination. For him, societies are not primarily driven by logical arguments or empirical proofs, but by grand myths—stories that confer meaning, inspire solidarity, and propel people to act.

The best-known of these is the myth of the general strike. Sorel didn’t treat it as a technical labor tactic, but as a “redemptive myth.” Its significance lay less in whether such a strike would ever actually occur, and more in the belief it could. That belief alone, he argued, had the capacity to mobilize masses, forge bonds among workers, and unleash social transformation.

Violence as Creative Energy

Sorel also became infamous for his attempt to “redeem” the idea of violence. For him, violence was not simply blind brutality. When wielded collectively and deliberately, it could serve as a creative force—breaking apart corrupt institutions and clearing the ground for a new social order. He imagined it as a kind of existential energy, a purging act through which societies free themselves from stagnation.

This interpretation was divisive. It inspired radical socialists, who saw in Sorel a philosopher of working-class empowerment. But it also attracted nationalists and even Italian fascists, who seized on his ideas to legitimize their own authoritarian politics. The irony is stark: a thinker who sought to empower labor through myth and violence became a reference point for some of the most anti-democratic movements of the 20th century.

Myth in the Present

It is tempting to consign Sorel to history, but his insights still resonate. Political myths are alive all around us. Nationalist movements, environmental campaigns, even the techno-utopian visions of Silicon Valley all rely on grand narratives of salvation, freedom, catastrophe, or rebirth.

Even in an age saturated with data, artificial intelligence, and “fake news,” myths remain more potent than most rational arguments. They provide identity, belonging, and purpose. And, as Sorel warned, they can also justify the use of force in their pursuit.

What We Can Learn from Sorel

Engaging with Sorel raises an uncomfortable question: can a society survive without myths? Perhaps, like oxygen, they are indispensable—vital even when dangerous. For Sorel, myths were never mere fictions; they were mechanisms of collective action, the spark that animates politics.

History, however, shows that when myths fuse with unrestrained violence, the consequences can be catastrophic. The lesson, then, may not be to revere myths or to dismiss them, but to understand their power—and to imagine how they might be channeled toward creative, plural, and non-destructive futures.

Sorel offered no simple answers. Instead, he held up a mirror: politics is never only about interests or rational calculation. It is a theatre of images and stories, where myths shape the trajectory of history. Recognizing this means recognizing why one idea—however unrealizable—can sometimes change the course of the world.

Might also interest you: 

Fanon’s Theory of Violence

Walter Benjamin's Critique of Violence

Hannah Arendt On Violence

Walter Benjamin and the Aesthetic Dimension of Politics

Walter Benjamin was not only a philosopher of history and memory; he was also one of the twentieth century’s most subtle thinkers on aesthetics. But for Benjamin, art was never just about beauty or culture in the narrow sense. It was inseparable from politics—not only in terms of content, but in terms of structure, experience, and perception. He understood that how we see the world is already a political matter.

Benjamin's reflections on art and media—particularly in his essay The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction (1936)—interrogate the ways in which political power and aesthetic form intersect, overlap, and sometimes fuse into each other. His concern was not just how politics influences aesthetics, but how politics itself can become aestheticized—and how this process can either liberate or dominate.

Mechanical Reproduction and the Shattering of Aura

At the heart of Benjamin’s aesthetics is the concept of the aura—that unique, unrepeatable presence of a work of art embedded in a particular time and place. A painting in a cathedral, a sculpture in a shrine—these works once carried a kind of ritual authority. They could not be owned, copied, or distributed. They demanded reverence.

But with modern technologies—photography, film, sound recording—art becomes reproducible. Its aura is shattered. Art becomes portable, democratized, stripped of its traditional cult value. This, Benjamin argued, is not merely a technical shift; it is a political one. The potential of mechanical reproduction lies in its capacity to strip art of its elitism, to bring images and narratives to the masses, to transform passive spectators into active participants.

Cinema, in particular, fascinated Benjamin because it fragmented perception and disrupted traditional narrative form. Unlike the still contemplation of a painting, film bombarded the viewer with rapid cuts, montage, and discontinuities. This shock, he believed, could awaken new forms of perception—sharpening attention, destabilizing assumptions, making the familiar strange.

Fascism and the Aestheticization of Politics

Yet the same technologies that democratized art could also be turned toward reactionary ends. In a famous passage, Benjamin warns that “fascism seeks to give the masses a chance to express themselves” while withholding real political power. Instead of transforming society, it turns politics into spectacle—into ritual, style, and theatricality. It substitutes emotional identification for rational critique, myth for argument, choreography for agency.

This is the aestheticization of politics: the transformation of politics into a work of art. Fascist rallies, uniforms, symbols, slogans, mass choreography—these were not incidental to the fascist project; they were its lifeblood. They made submission feel like transcendence, hierarchy feel like harmony, violence feel sublime.

For Benjamin, this was the perversion of aesthetics: to make destruction beautiful, and to substitute collective catharsis for emancipation.

The Politicization of Art

In response, Benjamin proposed the inverse: not the aestheticization of politics, but the politicization of art. This does not mean propaganda or didacticism. Rather, it means art that awakens, interrupts, challenges—art that refuses to serve as decoration for domination.

Revolutionary art, for Benjamin, reveals the cracks in the surface of things. It calls attention to the constructed nature of reality, to the fractures in history, to the voices silenced by the official narrative. It disorients in order to reorient. It transforms perception not to manipulate, but to liberate.

Photography and film, when used critically, could become tools of political awakening—making visible what is normally concealed, offering new angles on old truths, slowing time down enough for reflection to take hold.

A Legacy of Vigilance and Possibility

Walter Benjamin’s insight into the aesthetic dimension of politics remains powerfully relevant in a world saturated by images, performances, and emotional spectacle. From campaign ads to viral videos, from nationalist pageantry to the marketing of identity, the lines between politics and aesthetics continue to blur.

Benjamin teaches us to ask difficult but essential questions: What feelings are being orchestrated? What is being made to seem natural, inevitable, or heroic? What kind of seeing is being trained?

In a time when politics increasingly operates through sensation, style, and simulation, Benjamin’s work calls for a counter-aesthetics: one that disrupts, disenchants, and demands critical engagement. For him, the future of freedom may depend on how we see—and on whether art can still help us see otherwise.

Next article: Adorno on Nonidentity, Suffering, and the Refusal of Reconciliation

Back to: The Complete Introduction to the Frankfurt School

Przeworski on Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government

Adam Przeworski, one of the most influential political scientists, addresses a fundamental paradox of democracy in his book Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government (2010): the tension between democratic ideals and political reality. On the one hand, democracy is founded on principles of public participation, representation, and equality. On the other hand, it operates within institutional, economic, and social constraints that prevent it from fully delivering on its promises.

Przeworski identifies four fundamental principles of democracy: equality, participation, representation, and liberty. These principles form the cornerstone of democratic governance, yet he highlights the challenges in fully implementing them. For instance, while political participation is meant to be universal, numerous barriers—economic, educational, structural, and sometimes deliberately political—limit citizens’ ability to actively engage in decision-making processes.

A central discussion in the book revolves around the democratic decision-making process. Przeworski argues that although democracy is based on the idea of popular rule, in practice, citizens often make decisions that do not necessarily align with their own interests. This issue arises from the fact that democracies rely on knowledge and information, which are not distributed equally. As a result, certain groups—typically those with wealth and influence—are able to shape public discourse and steer decision-making in ways that serve their interests.

Another critical point Przeworski raises is the role of the market within democracy. While free economies are often perceived as complementary to democratic systems, he demonstrates how markets do not always function in ways that promote equality and participation. The economic power of corporations and private entities can distort the political process, creating a reality in which democracy exists primarily in form rather than substance—present on paper but far from being fully realized.

Przeworski does not limit himself to critique; he also proposes paths for improvement. He argues that to bridge the gap between ideal democracy and political reality, mechanisms for fair representation must be strengthened, a balance between economic interests and the public good must be maintained, and broader political education and information dissemination must be ensured. In this sense, he issues a call to action: democracy is not merely a system of laws and institutions but an ongoing struggle to realize its foundational principles.

Przeworski’s book serves as both a reminder of democracy’s importance and a warning about the challenges it faces. In doing so, he provides not only a theoretical analysis but also a framework for critical reflection on the political systems in which we live.

The Oil Spill Model: How Do Our Opinions Become More Extreme According to Daniel DellaPosta

Is modern society truly more politically polarized, or is it just an illusion fueled by sensationalist media and social networks? Daniel DellaPosta’s research, published in the American Sociological Review, provides a surprising answer. Instead of thinking of polarization as a strengthening of existing divisions, he offers a different metaphor: polarization spreads like an oil spill—starting in one place and gradually expanding until it covers a far larger area than initially expected.

The Problem with How We Measure Polarization

Traditional approaches to studying political polarization assume that political factions become more extreme in their existing positions—liberals become more liberal, and conservatives become more conservative. But when examining public opinion data over time, the picture is less clear. DellaPosta highlights that conventional measures of polarization do not show a dramatic shift toward more extreme beliefs in the general population. Most people still hold a mix of views, some of which do not neatly fit into "left" or "right" categories.

Oil Spill vs. High Fences

DellaPosta proposes that polarization should not be understood as a sharpening of individual ideological stances but as a restructuring of how our beliefs are interconnected. In the past, people could disagree on some issues but find common ground on others—for example, supporting higher taxes while also advocating for gun rights. Today, opinions tend to cluster into coherent packages. If you know someone’s stance on climate change, you are now far more likely to predict their views on abortion, immigration, or LGBTQ+ rights.

This is what DellaPosta refers to as the "oil spill model." Political attitudes are not becoming more extreme individually, but rather they are spreading and clustering together, making it harder to find ideological overlap between different groups.

How Did This Happen?

To test his theory, DellaPosta used data from the General Social Survey, which has tracked American public opinion since 1972. Instead of analyzing each issue separately, he created a network of beliefs—a system mapping out how different opinions are interconnected and how those connections have evolved over time.

The results reveal that over the last few decades, public opinion has become more tightly clustered. Views that were once independent of each other have increasingly aligned into distinct ideological packages. This means that when someone identifies as liberal or conservative, their entire belief system is more likely to match a predefined template rather than a mix of personal convictions.

What Are the Consequences?

DellaPosta’s findings help explain why political discourse has become so difficult. In the past, people with opposing views on economic policy, for example, could still find common ground on foreign policy. Today, however, if you disagree with someone on one issue, you are likely to disagree with them on almost everything else as well.

This has profound implications for democracy. It suggests that political identities have become more rigid, making bipartisan cooperation and compromise much harder. Social and media environments reinforce this effect by creating echo chambers, where exposure to opposing viewpoints is minimal, and beliefs become even more entrenched.

Is There a Way Back?

While DellaPosta’s research provides a compelling explanation for the rise in polarization, it does not offer a straightforward solution. As new issues become politicized—such as attitudes toward science, technology, or even lifestyle choices—polarization may continue to deepen.

However, by understanding that polarization is not just about growing differences but about the way opinions are structured, we may be able to design better strategies for fostering dialogue and breaking down rigid ideological clusters. Instead of focusing solely on countering extremism, efforts to bridge political divides might be more effective if they focus on disrupting the links between issues and encouraging more independent thinking.

The oil spill is spreading, but recognizing its patterns may be the first step toward cleaning it up.

Stanley Fish on Truth and Spins in Politics

Everyone involved in or following politics is familiar with the term "spin." According to researcher Stanley Fish, this tactic with its manipulative connotation is in fact at the core of political activity.

Fish defines "spin" as the process of shaping facts and narratives to fit a particular agenda. He challenges the perception that facts can stand alone, independent of interpretation. He cites the famous quote from Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, "You're entitled to your own opinions, but you're not entitled to your own facts," to illustrate a common misconception in political discourse. According to Fish, the notion that one can separate facts from opinions and truth from narratives is mistaken. In reality, facts are often constructed and based on the very process of argumentation itself. As Fish points out, "You're entitled to your own facts if you can get them accepted," emphasizing that what is accepted as fact is typically the result of persuasive argument, not objective truth.

The Role of Spin in Political Discourse

Fish argues that political arguments are never purely rational or straightforward; they are always infused with spin. Spin is not just a tactic used by politicians, but an essential part of political debate. All discourse, he claims, is shaped by the perspectives and biases of those involved, making it impossible to find a neutral, unmarked form of discourse. As a result, political arguments are inherently rhetorical, relying on ethos (character), pathos (emotion), and logos (logic) to persuade the audience.

Despite moments of resolution, such as elections, legislation, or court decisions, Fish asserts that political debates rarely, if ever, reach a true conclusion. Even after the enactment of policies or the selection of candidates, the underlying conflicts and debates continue, often in new forms. According to Fish, it is impossible to definitively settle a particular issue, as convincing someone who disagrees requires not only addressing the specific topic, but also the narrative that shapes it, their underlying assumptions, and more. Fish refers to this process as "conversion," akin to religious conversion, and while possible, it is extremely rare.

See also: 

Stanley Fish and the Value of Arguments

Stanley Fish's Reader-Response Theory Explained

Is There a Text in this Class?

Stanley Fish on Law, Politics and Literature

Fish's concept of Interpretive Communities

Deliberating Habermas's Deliberative Democracy

With the challenges facing democracy in the 21st century, deliberative democracy emerges as a theory that seeks to enhance democratic processes by emphasizing the role of open public debate. Rooted in the work of philosopher Jürgen Habermas, deliberative democracy offers a framework where discourse and debate are central to political decision-making. This theory posits that democracy should not be limited to voting or the aggregation of preferences but should also involve citizens engaging in reasoned debate and mutual justification of their positions.

Foundations of Deliberative Democracy

At the core of deliberative democracy is the idea that political legitimacy is derived from the communicative processes that precede decision-making. Habermas, a key figure in the development of this theory, argues that political discourse should be inclusive and egalitarian. This means that all participants in the discourse must see each other as equals, with everyone having the right to speak and challenge others' claims. Moreover, these discussions must be free from coercion, ensuring that the outcomes are the result of genuine consensus rather than force or manipulation.

This approach is grounded in what Habermas calls the "discourse principle." According to this principle, norms can be considered valid only if all those affected by them could agree to them in a rational discourse. In this way, deliberative democracy seeks to ensure that laws and policies are not merely the outcome of majority rule but are the product of collective reasoning that respects the perspectives of all citizens.

The Role of Public Spheres

Deliberative democracy distinguishes between "strong" and "weak" public spheres. The strong public sphere refers to formal institutions like parliaments, where decisions are made, and laws are passed. The weak public sphere, on the other hand, encompasses informal spaces for discussion, such as the media, civil society organizations, and everyday conversations among citizens.

Habermas asserts that these two spheres should be interconnected. The weak public sphere allows for a diversity of viewpoints and broad discussion of issues, while the strong public sphere ensures that these discussions influence the actual policymaking process. This interplay is crucial for the functioning of deliberative democracy, as it ensures that public opinion is not only heard but also has a tangible impact on governance.

Criticisms and Challenges

One common criticism of deliberative democracy is that it places unrealistic demands on citizens. Expecting people to engage in continuous, reasoned discourse may be idealistic, given the complexities of modern life and the varying levels of political knowledge among the populace. Additionally, critics argue that deliberative democracy may inadvertently privilege those who are more articulate or have better access to platforms for discourse, thereby reinforcing existing inequalities.

Another challenge is the potential for the deliberative process to be co-opted by powerful interests. While the theory emphasizes equality and inclusiveness, the reality is that not all voices are heard equally, and some groups may dominate the conversation. This raises concerns about whether deliberative democracy can truly deliver on its promise of fair and just decision-making.

The Future of Deliberative Democracy

Despite these challenges, deliberative democracy remains a powerful and influential theory in contemporary political thought. It offers a vision of democracy that goes beyond mere voting, emphasizing the importance of dialogue, mutual understanding, and reasoned argumentation. As democratic societies continue to grapple with issues such as polarization, misinformation, and declining trust in institutions, the principles of deliberative democracy may provide crucial insights into how to revitalize democratic practices.

Montesquieu's influence on modern democracies

Charles-Louis de Secondat, better known as Montesquieu, was an 18th-century French thinker whose influence on modern democracies was decisive. His ideas, developed mainly in his famous book "The Spirit of the Laws," were a cornerstone in shaping democratic government systems worldwide.

One of Montesquieu's most significant contributions to modern democracy is the principle of separation of powers. He argued that to ensure political freedom, government power must be divided into three separate and independent authorities: legislative, executive, and judicial. This idea has been adopted by many democratic countries, with the most prominent example being the US Constitution. The separation of powers is intended to prevent the concentration of power in one party's hands and to ensure a system of checks and balances, which is a pillar of modern democracies.

Montesquieu also greatly contributed to the modern concept of the rule of law. He believed that the law should be supreme over any person or institution, including the king or the government. This idea was revolutionary at the time when kings enjoyed absolute power, and it is now a fundamental principle in any functioning democracy.

Montesquieu's conception of political freedom had a profound effect on the development of human and civil rights. He defined freedom as "the right to do whatever the laws permit," a concept that took root in many democratic constitutions. Furthermore, his support for religious freedom and the separation of religion and state formed the basis for the principles of secularism in many modern countries.

Montesquieu's influence is also evident in criminal law. He opposed torture and cruel punishments, arguing that punishment should be proportional to the seriousness of the crime. These ideas influenced reforms in many countries' legal systems and led to a more humanitarian approach to punishment.

Montesquieu also contributed to the development of representative government. He argued that in large countries, the best way to ensure adequate representation of citizens' interests is through elected representatives. This idea forms the basis of parliamentary systems and representative democracies worldwide.

Montesquieu's influence is also evident in international relations. He argued that international trade promotes peace and cooperation between countries, an idea that influenced the development of the global economy and modern diplomacy.

Although almost 300 years have passed since "The Spirit of the Laws" was published, Montesquieu's principles continue to be relevant and are a touchstone for functioning democracies today. Montesquieu's influence on modern democracies is deep and far-reaching. From the separation of powers and the rule of law, to human rights and civil liberties, representative government, and international relations, his ideas shaped the structure and values of democratic countries worldwide.

Kant and the Social Contract

Immanuel Kant is not typically categorized among the primary thinkers of the social contract theory, yet his ideas have profoundly influenced political philosophy and our understanding of the relationship between individuals and the state.

Social contract theory, as developed by thinkers like Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, posits that individuals consent to surrender certain freedoms to an authority in exchange for the protection of their remaining rights. Kant's approach to this concept was distinctive, grounded in his broader ethical framework.

At the heart of Kant's philosophy is the concept of human dignity and autonomy. He argued that rational beings possess inherent worth that must always be respected. This led him to articulate his famous "categorical imperative," which asserts that one should only act according to maxims that could be universally applied as laws.

When applied to society, Kant believed that a just political system must honor the autonomy of its citizens. He contended that laws should be formulated as if they were the result of a collective agreement by all rational beings. This idea serves as the foundation of Kant's interpretation of the social contract.

### Social Contract and Morality

Unlike earlier contract theorists who emphasized self-interest or the avoidance of conflict, Kant focused on moral duty and reason. He maintained that individuals have a moral obligation to enter into civil society and abide by its laws—not out of fear or self-interest, but because it is the rational and ethical course of action.

Kant envisioned an ideal state where citizens are both the authors and subjects of the law. He advocated for a republican form of government (though not necessarily a democracy), where laws would be determined by the will of the people, while upholding their freedom and equality.

However, Kant also acknowledged the necessity of authority. He argued that without a common force to enforce laws, people would remain in a "state of nature," where rights could not be effectively guaranteed. Thus, for Kant, the social contract was a moral imperative to establish and sustain a just legal order.

Kant's ideas continue to exert influence on modern political thought. His emphasis on human dignity and autonomy underpins many contemporary human rights frameworks. Moreover, his insistence on the moral foundation of political authority challenges us to consider principles beyond mere self-interest in our social and political structures. This perspective forms a critical aspect of the broader concept of the social contract.

The Social Contract: Comparing Hobbes, Rousseau and Locke

What Binds Us Together as a Society?

Is it fear, nature, or reason that connects and holds us together? This profound question lies at the core of social contract theory—a cornerstone of political philosophy that explores the intricate relationship between individuals and the governments they form. Three towering figures of Enlightenment thought—Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and John Locke—each offered distinct visions of this foundational agreement that shapes human society. Their ideas continue to influence our understanding of government and individual rights today.

Hobbes: The Iron Grip of the Leviathan

Thomas Hobbes, writing in the aftermath of the English Civil War, presented a grim view of human nature. He argued that, in the absence of a powerful authority, life would be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." According to Hobbes, the social contract emerges from fear and the instinct for self-preservation. People, he posited, willingly surrender their natural rights to an all-powerful sovereign—the Leviathan—in exchange for security and order. This absolute ruler would wield unlimited power to maintain peace, as only the fear of punishment could ensure social stability. Yet, Hobbes leaves us questioning: What price do we pay for such security?

Rousseau: The General Will and the Noble Savage

Jean-Jacques Rousseau offered a starkly different perspective, idealizing the "noble savage" and arguing that humans are inherently good but corrupted by society. Rousseau's vision of the social contract sought to harmonize individual freedom with the collective needs of the community. He introduced the concept of the "general will"—a collective interest that transcends individual desires. In Rousseau's ideal society, citizens would actively participate in lawmaking, fostering a deep sense of civic duty. However, this raises a critical question: Can such direct democracy function in complex modern societies? Critics have pointed out that placing the general will above individual rights can lead to the suppression of personal freedoms, and some even accuse Rousseau of laying the groundwork for totalitarian ideologies.

Locke: Reason, Rights, and Limited Government

John Locke struck a balance between Hobbes' pessimism and Rousseau's idealism. He argued that humans possess natural rights to life, liberty, and property, which exist independently of government. For Locke, the social contract is a rational agreement to protect these rights. His vision of government was limited in scope, deriving its legitimacy from the consent of the governed. Locke also asserted that if a government failed to safeguard natural rights, citizens had the right to rebel—a principle that profoundly influenced the American and French revolutions.

The Legacy of the Social Contract

Hobbes, Rousseau, and Locke offer us distinct lenses through which to view the relationship between citizen and state. Hobbes reminds us of our need for security, Rousseau of our capacity for collective action, and Locke of our inalienable rights. In today’s world, we grapple with questions that resonate with these philosophies. How do we balance security and freedom in the face of global threats? Can direct democracy thrive in the age of social media? What are the limits of individual rights in a diverse society? As we navigate these complexities, the social contract theories of Hobbes, Rousseau, and Locke remain vital frameworks for understanding governance and civic responsibility. They challenge us to reflect on the foundations of legitimate authority, the nature of human society, and our obligations to one another.

Carl Schmitt, Democracy and the State of Emergency

Carl Schmitt, a controversial and highly influential political theorist in the 20th century, made a significant impact on the discussion surrounding democracy, sovereignty, and states of emergency. His ideas delve into the limitations and vulnerability of democratic systems and how they are affected during times of crisis.

Schmitt's Critique of Liberal Democracy

At the core of Schmitt's critique is his belief that liberal democracies, with their focus on discussion, consensus, and individual rights, are ill-equipped to handle existential crises and emergencies. According to him, during severe threats, the slow process of parliamentary debate becomes an obstacle to effective decision-making. For Schmitt, politics revolves around the distinction between friend and foe, and democracies that prioritize inclusion and dialogue can blur that distinction, hindering decisive action.

Sovereignty and the Decision

One of Schmitt's most famous statements is: "The sovereign is the one who decides on the exception." This means that the true test of sovereignty lies not in the day-to-day functioning of a state, but in its ability to act decisively during exceptional circumstances, such as a state of emergency. Schmitt argues that the sovereign's power to declare a state of emergency and take necessary measures, even if they contradict established laws, demonstrates the primacy of politics over law and force over justice.

The State of Emergency

Schmitt's concept of the state of emergency is rooted in his belief that governmental and legal systems, no matter how successful, cannot anticipate or handle every possible crisis. During unexpected crises, the sovereign must act outside the legal framework to ensure the survival of the state. Schmitt's position has drawn criticism because, while it recognizes the limitations of legal systems, it also opens the door for anti-democratic and repressive regimes to exploit emergency situations.

Schmitt and the Weimar Republic

Schmitt's theories did not arise in isolation. Witnessing the instability of the Weimar Republic, he grew increasingly disillusioned with the idea of parliamentary democracy. The frequent use of emergency orders during the Weimar period, particularly Article 48, which allowed the president to take emergency measures without parliamentary consent, seemed to confirm Schmitt's views on the inadequacy of liberal democracy and the necessity of sovereign decision-making.

The Double-Edged Sword

While Schmitt's insights into the weaknesses of democratic systems and the nature of political decision-making are valuable, they also come with significant risks. The unchecked power of the sovereign, especially during emergencies, can lead to an authoritarian regime, as history has shown in Schmitt's own Germany. The challenge, therefore, is to acknowledge the limitations of democratic systems without undermining their fundamental values.

Benedict Anderson's Definition of Nation - summary

According to Benedict Anderson in Imagined Communities, the "nation" has four essential characteristics:

It is " introduced [...] because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of the others [...], but the idea of ​​their community exists in everyone's head." […] In fact, all communities that are larger than the village ones with their face-to-face contacts are imagined communities. " 

It is “ limited [...] because even the largest of them [...] lives within precisely defined, albeit variable, limits beyond which other nations lie. […] Even the most ardent nationalists do not dream of the day when all members of the human race will belong to their nation ” - in contrast to religious communities with a conversion mission such as Christianity.

It is “ sovereign because its concept was born at a time when the Enlightenment and revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the hierarchical-dynastic [sic] empires thought of by God's grace. [...] The yardstick and symbol of this freedom is the sovereign state ”. 

It is a " community [...] because, regardless of real inequality and exploitation, it is understood as a 'comradely' association of equals."

Imagined Communities by Benedict Anderson - overview and review

Imagined Communities is an important and influential book by Benedict Anderson, an international relations researcher published in 1983. In the book Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson analyzes the phenomenon of nationalism and national consciousness as it emerged in the 20th century.

Benedict Anderson's main argument in terms of an "imagined community" is that a group of people defined as a nation is in fact an "imagined" political entity that exists only in the minds of people and not in reality. The central idea of ​​"imaginary communities" is that a nation is formed as soon as a group of people unites around common ideas or perceptions that cause them to function as a unified group for a common goal, regardless of their relationship in reality. A good example of "imaginary communities" could be for example the Jewish people who were scattered all over the world and lived very different lifestyles but united around a national consciousnessOne of Zionism as it is expressed in the Land of Israel. The imaginary consciousness of imaginary communities is so strong that it can motivate people to acts like going to war even at the cost of their lives for the same ideal that exists solely in their mind. The contemporary expression of imaginary communities is the nation-states uniting under different groups and different individuals under the “umbrella” of a common consciousness that unites them. Imaginary communities of nations or nations replaced in the twentieth century those more traditional imaginary communities that were expressed in religious consciousness like Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

The most fundamental point of Benedict Anderson's book "Imaginary Communities" is that in today's nation states not all members of the community know each other, and these are just "imagined" mental foundations that bind them to each other and form bonds of mutual commitment and joint activity. According to Benedict Anderson, imaginary communities also create imaginary boundaries between those who are members of this community and those who are not members of it, which could explain the treatment of foreigners in contemporary nation-states.

To Benedict Anderson 's analysis in the book "Imaginary Communities" The printing revolution and capitalism which accompanied it play a significant role in the creation of modern nation-states. The pattern allowed for the widespread dissemination of common ideas and it created the unification of language, both verbal and metaphorical, between different people who thus began to form a national consciousness. According to Benedict Anderson, printing led to the distribution of materials written in mass languages ​​and accessible to a growing public of literate people, in contrast to the prevailing texts before the printing revolution that were limited to scriptures in languages ​​that were not accessible to the general public. It is capitalism that has driven this mechanism by the desire of printers to reach as wide an audience as possible and to adapt the printed content to their abilities and tastes. This trend led to the unification of different dialects that served different human groups and led to the creation of “imaginary communities” around a common language and prevailing ideas that were disseminated through the same new form of communication that came into being. That is, the new common language created due to the printing revolution united different groups and strengthened their common consciousness. The formation of novels as well as newspapers strengthened the formation of imaginary communities because it united people around events and in fact information common to all, thus creating a common consciousness of people who in practice had no direct connection with each other. That is, through the printed newspaper, people in different places and different situations could know and share the same information and the same events and thus imagined communities were created.

Another element that constitutes imaginary communities according to Benedict Anderson is shared memory. The rise of nationalism in the 19th century caused many peoples to "invent" for themselves a distant common past that was in fact at the same time an outgrowth and the cause of their consciousness forming as a people that is, of course, an imaginary community.

In conclusion, Benedict Anderson's "Imaginary Communities" states that nationality is in fact a collective imagination of a group of people that unites them through a shared memory and consciousness, and causes them to act out of a commitment to an actual political framework based on imagined foundations.

see also: Benedict Anderson's Definition of Nation

Rawls / A Theory of Justice – brief summary

 background:

All approaches in political science actually try to describe what society deserves even though it is a field related to philosophy. John Rawls - the important political philosopher at the end of the 20th century was almost the first, after 100 years of anti-philosophical perception in the social sciences and not dealing with these questions, to say that the big basic questions should be asked what is proper society? Rawls writes the book "A Theory of Justice" in which he describes the principles of justice of the proper society, and in doing so he succeeds in arousing around him a broad discourse around these questions.

 

Article Summary:

Rawls advance a perception of justice as fairness - a concept that assumes that human beings are free and intelligent beings equal to each other who together decide to advance their interests, unite together and accept the principles of justice that form the basis for creating social cooperation. Everyone who engages in social cooperation chooses the principles According to which the basic rights and obligations of the individuals in the company will be granted.

Justice as fairness is the original state of man - in which each person participates in a discussion of the principles of justice (and not of common values ​​because there can be no broad consensus) out of thought of what is good and worthy in his eyes In society and what will be his fate, what is his power, what is his wisdom and therefore man's participation in the discussion of the principles of justice is behind the veil of ignorance (no one knows what his fate will be in the end) - thus no one is deprived or gaining an advantage over the other.

Once human beings choose the initial principles of justice they will choose a constitution and a legislature and from there on and these choices will be based on general agreement on the part of everyone because everything will be according to the principles of justice set in the initial situation.

Rawls presents two different principles that he believes constitute the basic principles of justice:

1. liberty and equality in the allocation of basic rights and obligations. Each person works for himself as long as it does not infringe on the right of the other.

2. cultural and economic differences are justified only when they yield compensatory benefits to all and especially to the disadvantaged in society. And so here there is no room for the intervention of institutions because the good of the many will usually compensate the weak - but only the weakest.

De Tocqueville's Observations of American Democracy - summary

Tocqueville regarded the United states a country in which liberalism and political equality were dominant. Sovereignty of the people had been achieved, in contrast to European countries. He was impressed with the the level of egality prevailing in society: looking at the family as a reflection of society at large, but also relations between wealthy people and their servants, even military organizations were conceptualized egalitarian and liberally. Although subordination could be observed, it was done only for a limited time and happened by free will, which preserved the equality between two sides.

As factors for the maintainance of liberal democracy Tocqueville named three factors: special outer circumstances, the institutions, and political culture. The first two were only marginally described. Political culture seemed to be the more decisive point. Consequently he only noted a few observations about the first two, such as the special economic conditions. Possession of land was widely spread in the States and fostered liberalism. He noted several ideas on institutions, for example how the federal system and decentralization affected the way citizens paricipate in democracy. Political culture, however, was considered to be highly relevant. Tocqueville noted the consense over the republican structure in America, a strong sense of public responsibility, although public and individual interests were partially considered as affiliated. Religion can be included in the description of political culture, as he saw its function in contributing to political order more than the meanings of strong beliefs. The Frenchman admired the high level of political education at the time, the common knowledge about public affairs. As mentioned before, he deemed this factor a decisive prerequisite for maintaining a working democratic system, since he had seen the democratic experiment fail in France before largely because of a lack of responsible citizenry.

When examining the emphases that Tocqueville, but also Lieber chose to document in their reports, one has to consider that both were biased in a way that they were actively looking for certain aspects that were according to their personal convictions, and also that they were dissatisfied with aspects of the systems in their home-country, just like many other European travellers and emigrants who came to the United States. In France and Germany political discussion was preoccupied with the controversy about election laws, freedom of press and (in France) the educational system much more than with that about the civil right of free formation of associations. In the Declaration of Civil and Human Rights of 1789 the latter is not even mentioned. The individualist and centralist ideology which constituted the source of this neglect, explains some differences to the American democratic system which formed later on. See also: De Tocqueville's Notion of Democracy

De Tocqueville's Notion of Democracy - summary

De Tocqueville grew up in a time when the nation was ideologically split between loyaltists of the monarchy and anti-monarchists. Although liberals were marked as anti-monarchists in general, there was current of so-called Doctrinaireswho Tocqueville felt affiliated to. This group proposed the idea of installing the constitutional monarchy as a compromise between monarchy and republic, while extending the census suffrage to the entire middle class and liberalizing the legislature. Furthermore, they propagated the extension of the education system, aiming at raising the general level of education among the people in order to mold citizens who could take the responsibility to vote.

The socio-political circumstances in Tocqueville's life have to be considered when evaluating his use of the notion 'democracy' in his descriptions of the American political system. Does this term denote the levelling off of society? Does Tocqueville think of the reign of uncontrolled masses, or does he contemplate political equality in terms of common suffrage? Legal and political notions of democracy are opposed to each other. De Tocqueville uses the term in different connotations, but the French idea of democracy did not include the common notion of 'government of the people by the people'. In France the revolution had produced a democracy consisting primarily of elemination of privileges and class order of the Ancien Régime. Hence, most French perceived democracy as a new form of social order, which, compared with the old aristocratic order, could be characterized by the abolition of rigid hierarchic order with its typical traditional distribution of power and privileges. Although class differences persist within democracy, social mobility is one characteristic feature of democracy.

Tocqueville's concept of democracy changed throughout the time. In 1830 he regarded democracy as a dynamic process, which required an 'equality of conditions'. In his view the democratic process - i.e. the change of social order - would come to a halt when all political priviledges were eradicated. Later, in his second volume of Democracy in America, which was published in 1840, a more negative image of democracy prevailed: that of a levelling power which would not be restricted to social order, but which would also challenge the right of material property. Furthermore, he saw the danger that democracy could level any intellectual or individualistic distinctions. The notion of 'tyranny of the masses' formed in Tocqueville's mind.

Beside this sociologic observation, liberty is a reocurring notion in Tocqueville's understanding of democracy. The way he uses this notion implies that he interprets liberty not only as protection from the abuse of governmental power, but more as a positivistic idea of liberty as an asset which each citizen is obliged to make active use of. On the other hand he sees the necessity to restrict individual liberty and to "regulate it by believes, mores and laws." This is meant when he talks about 'liberté modérée'. Tocqueville's liberalism is characterized by the defence of liberty against authority, but also by defence of authority against liberty. Moreover, Tocqueville favors the classic theory of representation, like his friend John Stuart Mill, who advised a system in which the citizens should elect the most capable among themselves to represent them. The problem for France was that the population did not consist of responsible citizens which were necessary for the desired liberal system. The French people had proved during the years after the revolution that it was not able to exert their democratic rights. Still Tocqueville believed it would be possible to educate the people to transform them into citizens and to change the political culture in France. see also: De Tocqueville's Observations of American Democracy

Summary: Hegemony, Gramsci and International relations / RW Cox

There are two main stands leading to the Gramscian idea of hegemony:

1. The third international concerning the strategy of Bolsheviks and the creation of a socialist state.

2. the writings from Machiavelli.

He is looking for a way of creating Hegemony and he wants to mention conditions. He enlarges the definition of the state. He says that it is possible that leaders hand out power to other civil instances, as long as they recognize the hegemony. So Gramsci says that the notion of the state would also have to include the underpinnings of the political structure in civil society. Gramsci thought of this in concrete historical terms. All the institutions that form people are consistent with the hegemonic order.

Gramsci comes to the conclusion that western societies differ fundamentally from Russian societies. Because of their intern organisation, it was hard for communists to turn over the state to with a revolutionary approach. He states that a war of movement is not the way to deal with the western societies, a war of position is better. This means you slowly build up the strength of the social foundation of a new state. In western Europe, the struggle had to be won in civil society before an assault on the state could achieve success. The difficulty about this is the fact that you have to create a counter hegemony with all new institutions and intellectual resources.

Gramsci says there are two kinds of societies; on has undergone a social revolution and worked out fully its consequences in new modes of production and social relations. The other kind were societies which had so to speak imported or had trust upon them aspects of a new order created abroad, without the old being replaced. In these societies, there was no active hegemony because the opposing forces did not succeed in creating a revolution. This created passive revolution conditions.

There are some typical accompaniments to passive revolution:

1. Ceasarism. A strong man intervenes to resolve the stalemate between equal and opposed social forces. There are progressive (when strong rules presides over a more orderly development of a new state) and reactionary (when it stabilises existing power).

2. transformismo. The widest possible coalition of interests. It is about cooperation between subaltern social groups.

We use passive revolution to show that there is no active hegemony because no dominant class has been able to establish a hegemony in Gramsci’s sense of term.

Gramsci states that state and society together constituted a solid structure strong enough to replace the first. Such a structure is a historic bloc. Ideas and material are always relating and mutually influencing each other. An historic bloc cannot exist without a hegemonic social class. A new bloc can occur when a sub group brings his ideas to the stage in a society and overrules the others. In western societies, this will be done by a war of position.

In the creation of historic blocs, three levels of consciousness are separated: economic-cooperative, solidarity of class consciousness and the hegemonic.

Hegemony and international relations.

The state remains for Gramsci the basic entity in international relations and the place where social conflicts take place, the place also, therefore where hegemonies of social classes can be built. The emergence of new worker led blocs at the national level would, in this line of reasoning, precede any basic restructuring of international relations. States that are powerful, have undergone a profound social and economic revolution and have most worked out the consequences of this revolution in the form of social relations.

Hegemony and world order.

It would appear that, historically, to become hegemonic, a state would have to found and protect a world order which is universal in its conception. The hegemonic concept of world order is founded not only upon the regulation of inter-state conflict but also upon a globally conceived civil society, a mode of production of global extent which brings about links among social classes of the countries encompassed by it. A hegemon can encompass more peripheral countries in it by a passive revolution. in the world hegemonic model, hegemony is more intense and consistent at the core and more contradicting at the periphery. Hegemony is an order with world economy with a dominant of production  which penetrates into all countries. It also encompasses social relationships. You can describe it as social, political and economic structure.

Mechanisms of hegemony: IOs.

IOs form the process through which a hegemon can develop its ideology in to the world. Features that express IOs and their hegemonic role are:

1. They embody the rules which facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world order.

2. They are themselves the product of hegemonic world order. 

3. They ideologically legitimate the norms of the world order. 

4. They co-opt the elites from peripheral countries

5. They absorb counter hegemonic ideas.

International institutions are usually formed by the hegemonic state and its rules.

The prospects for Counter-Hegemony. 

world orders are grounded in social relations. Gramsci’s analysis of Italy: only a war of position can, in the long run, bring about structural changes, and a war of position involves building up the socio political base for change through the creation of new historic blocs. This is the core of changing the world. 

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Summary: The Demand for International Regimes / Robert Keohane

The article ‘The Demand for International Regimes’ by Robert Heohane  tries to improve our understanding of international order trough interpretation of international regime- formation that relies on rational-choice analysis in the utilitarian social contract tradition. 5 parts: 1. systemic constraint-choice analysis; 2. context + functions of international regimes; 3. theory of the demand for international regimes; 4. issues of closure and communication; 5. control-oriented regimes will be supplemented by insurance regimes

à why should self-interested actors in world politics seek to establish international regimes through mutual agreement? 

Theory of hegemonic stability: concentration of power in one dominant state makes the development of strong regimes easier

BUT: - this theory fails to explain lags between changes in power structures + international regimes

          - fails to explain why international regimes are much more extensive than earlier

1. Systematic constraint-choice analysis: virtues + limitations

- systemic theory: changes in outcomes are explained on basis of changes in the system itself, not on the actor: the actor is not a variable, but is seen to respond rationally to constraints + incentives.

à thus, decisions about creating/joining an international regime are affected by system-level changes. 

-use of rational choice theory (constraint-choice theory) implies that we must view decisions involving international regimes as ‘voluntarily’

HOWEVER: we know that world politics is something in which power is often exercised, and often with great inequality à how do international regimes come into being voluntary? 

 1. Imposition of constraints: dictated by environmental factors + powerful actors. 

‘imposed regime’ = regime agreed upon within constraints that are mandated by powerful actors. 

à actor choices will be constrained in a way that allows preferences of more powerful actors having greater weight. 

- constraint-choice analysis captures non-hierarchical nature of world politics without ignoring the role played by power + ineguality

We must, when looking at international regimes, that states are utility-maximizers, and rational. 

à in general: states join those regimes where benefits outweigh the costs

- the most important function of a regime (= contract/quasi-agreement) is to establish mutual expectations about other’s behaviour.

- changes in extent + strength of international regimes can be explained by reference to changes in characteristic of the international system (where actors make choices) or of regimes themselves (about which choices are made)

QUESTION: why should disadvantaged actors join regimes?

2. Context and functions of international regimes

- function of an international regime is to facilitate the making of mutually beneficial agreements.

- the actors in this model operate within a self-help system (Waltz), which mean that the actors cannot call higher authority to solve their problems or provide protection. 

Keohane: the theory of hegemonic stability focuses on the supply-side of international regimes: hegemonic international systems should be characterised by levels of public goods production higher than in fragmented systemà this ignores the demand side of international regimes: why should governments desire to institute international regimes? How much are they willing to contribute to keep them?

- Context: agreements in regime context are stronger than ad hoc agreements (formed for one specific purpose) 

                à Keohane compares again to economy: market failure occurs when the outcomes of the market are sub-optional:  agreements that would be beneficial to all parties are not made. 

                à International regimes help to reduce the barriers for optimal agreements (market failure).

Public goods give rise to the demand for international regimes which can improve problems of transactions costs and information imperfections that obstruct effective decentralized responses to problems of providing public goods.

3. Elements of a theory of the demand for international regimes

There is an important distinction between the demand regimes and demand for ad hoc agreements: 

- regimes facilitate the making of substantive agreements by providing a framework of rules, norms, priniciples, and procedures of for negotiation. 

à the demand for AGREEMENTS is exogenous: may be influenced by many factors (especially by the perceptions that leaders have about their interests in agreement or non-agreements. 

à international regimes are demanded when they make possible agreements yielding net benefits that would not be possible on ad hoc basis agreements. 

Ronald Coase expresses in his theory: Coase Theorem, three ways in which international regimes can help the agreements made:

a) legal framework establishing liability for actions

b) perfect information

c) zero transaction costs.

à demand for international regimes is high when costs are lower than benefits, and if costs of ad hoc agreements are higher than the regime agreements. When the isse-density is low, ad hoc agreements are more attractive, since they are about a specific area. But when the issue-density is high, and thus the interdependence higher, the demand for international regimes will grow. 

There are three specific problems that give rise to the demand for international regimes:

1) asymmetric information: expecting that the resulting bargains will be unfair. ‘outsiders’ (states who have less information about the situation than others), will not want to make agreements

2) moral hazard: agreements may sometimes alter incentives with result that cooperative behaviour is discouraged. (Insurance companies have this all the time, property insurance makes people less careful with their propert à increase the risk of loss)

3) deception and irresponsibility: some actors may enter an agreement without intention of fulfilling, or others can be irresponsible and make commitments they are not able to fulfill.

4. Information, openness, and communication in international regimes

International regimes can help to increase quantity and quality of communication and to encourage openness: regimes do this by:

- linking issuesà important way of dealing with deception: deception is less profitable in an agreement involving many issues (state who is carrying out deception, or ‘cheating’ will be closely monitored by other states)  

- increase quantity + quality of communication: lighten the information problems.

5. Coping with uncertainties: insurance regimes

- participating in international cooperation is always risky: if others fail to cooperate, the cooperating states may suffer.

- governments are always comparing the risks they would run from lack of regulation of issue-areas, with the risks of entering an international regime 

- Most international regimes are control-oriented regimes: 

àmembers maintain some degree of control over each other’s behaviour: necessary condition for this type of regime is that the benefits of membership outweigh the costs. 

à they are based on the theory of hegemonic stability

à seek to ensure 2 kinds of regularity: 

1. internal: refers to orderly patterns of behaviour among members in the regime.

2. environmental: refers to behaviour between member-states and outsiders. (e.g. military alliances is extreme case of attempting environmental control) 

HOWEVER: this is not the only type of regime that exists:

Insurance Regime: is established voluntarily by common benefit, but weaker because no one enforces it.

6. Conclusion

- INTERNATIONAL REGIMES CAN BE INTERPRETED AS DEVICES TO FACILITATE AGREEMENTS, BY PROVIDING RULES, NORMS, PRINCIPLES, AND PROCEDURES THAT HELP ACTORS TO OVERCOME BARRIERS TO AGREEMENT IDENTIFIED BY ECONOMIC THEORY OF MARKET FAILURE

- DEMAND-SIDE OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: 

a) INCREASED ISSUE DENSITY WILL LEAD TO INCREASED DEMAND FOR INTERNATIONAL REGIMES

b) DEMAND FOR INTERNATIONAL REGIMES WILL BE PART OF A FUNCTION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE REGIMES THEMSELVES IN DEVELOPING NORMS OF GENERALIZED COMMINMENT AND IN PROVIDING HIGH-QUALITY INFORMATION TO POLICY-MAKERS. 

- CONSTRAINT-CHOICE THEORY HELPS US HOW TRANS-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS WORK + CHANGE. 

- HEGEMONY IS NOT A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR STABLE INTERNATIONAL REGIMES. 

see also: International Institutions: Two Approaches / Robert Keohane

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