Cultural Reader: Paul Ricoeur on Ethics and Justice

For Paul Ricoeur, ethics and justice are not abstract concepts detached from human life but emerge from the ways people interpret themselves, their actions, and their relationships with others. Across his writings, especially Oneself as Another (1990), The Just (1995), and Reflections on the Just (2007), Ricoeur articulates an ethical vision grounded in hermeneutics—the interpretation of human existence, narratives, and institutions.

The Ethical Aim: The Good Life with and for Others

Ricoeur defines ethics as “the aim of the good life, with and for others, in just institutions.” This well-known formula contains three key dimensions:

The Good Life – An Aristotelian element: human flourishing (eudaimonia), the pursuit of a meaningful life.
With and For Others – An emphasis on relationality: ethical life is not solitary but built on recognition, reciprocity, and responsibility.
In Just Institutions – A political and social dimension: ethics must be embedded in fair and legitimate structures, from laws to communities.

This definition reveals Ricoeur’s distinctive synthesis of Aristotle’s teleological ethics and Kant’s deontological ethics, held together by a hermeneutics of selfhood and responsibility.

Justice as the Extension of Ethics

While ethics concerns the “good life,” justice arises when human beings confront the need to regulate competing claims fairly. Ricoeur views justice as the public expression of ethics, particularly where conflicts of interest and values cannot be resolved by personal generosity or private morality alone.

Justice therefore requires institutions—courts, laws, and procedures—that embody fairness. But Ricoeur insists these institutions must remain open to interpretation and critique, avoiding the rigidity of pure legalism. Justice is not just about rules; it is about ensuring that institutions remain aligned with the ethical aim of human flourishing.

The Role of Recognition

A central thread in Ricoeur’s ethical thought is the concept of recognition. Justice requires not only fair distribution of goods but also the recognition of persons as subjects of dignity. In this way, Ricoeur extends ethics beyond material fairness toward the affirmation of identity, respect, and human worth.

Recognition bridges the personal and political: it is how individuals are seen within communities and how institutions affirm the equality of citizens.

Practical Wisdom and Moral Conflict: From Ethics to Politics

Ricoeur acknowledges that ethical life often involves tragic conflicts where duties and goods clash. Here, he appeals to practical wisdom (phronesis), drawing again on Aristotle. Justice is not about applying universal rules mechanically but about discerning the right course of action in concrete situations. This allows his ethics to remain sensitive to pluralism, ambiguity, and the complexities of human life.

For Ricoeur, justice links individual responsibility to collective structures. He insists that just institutions—laws, courts, and political systems—are the conditions for living ethically with others. Yet he also warns that institutions can become oppressive if detached from their ethical aim. This tension calls for a continual hermeneutics of justice: interpreting, critiquing, and reforming institutions so they remain truly just.

The Hermeneutics of the Good Life

Ricoeur’s conception of ethics and justice is both personal and political, both philosophical and practical. His definition—“the good life, with and for others, in just institutions”—captures a vision of ethical life that integrates flourishing, responsibility, and fairness.

In a world of plural values and social conflicts, Ricoeur offers a framework where ethics becomes not only a personal aspiration but a shared project of building just institutions. His thought remains a vital resource for contemporary debates on democracy, law, and human dignity.