Thursday, January 4, 2018

Speech Acts Classifications

Searle (1979) suggests that speech acts consist of five general classifications to classify the functions or illocutionary of speech acts; these are declarations, representatives, expressives, directives, and commissive.
Declaration speech act is the act that makes the propositional content corresponds with the reality. This type of speech act is the same as Austin’s performative sentence. In order to perform a declarations effectively, the speaker must have a special contextual privileges that allow him/her to perform an also contextual declaration. For example, when a priest says “I pronounce you husband and wife”, the priest (in the context of marriage) has the privilege to pronounce marriage and when this utterance is performed, the man and woman is then changed from singles into married people from the moment on. On the contrary, if the speaker is not a priest or has the privilege to marry people, the utterance will not be effective.
The next type of speech act is commisive. Commissives speech acts are the act of commiting to future actions. This type of speech act shows the intention of the speaker in the future which will be made to happen in later moment. One example of commissive is “I will come to your home tonight”. This example shows that the speaker intends to come to the hearer’s home at the night time of the day the utterance is said. Therefore the speaker commits that he/she will come to the speaker’s home at night. In simple English, the term of this speech act is commonly called promise.
Expressives are the type of speech act that shows the expression of the speaker via utterance. For example, “I’m sorry”, “I like it”, “Thank you”. These examples show how the speaker feels about a situation. In time when the speaker spoils coffee over someone else’s shirt he/she will say “I’m sorry”, when in time the speaker is given a slice of cheese and likes it then he/she will say “I like it” or “Thank you”, and so on.
Other type of speech act is directives. This type of speech act aims to make someone else to do something that the speaker desires. For instance, “could you lend me a pen?” this utterance shows that the speaker requests a pen from someone else, he/she indirectly order the other person to lend him a pen this gesture is also available in a more direct way as “Lend me a pen!” The intention of these utterances is to make the hearer to perform the action conveyed in the utterance itself. Directives are also known as asking, ordering, requesting, inviting, advising, and begging.
The last type of speech act is representative. In representative speech act, the speaker’s intention is to assert the speaker’s belief. One example is “I’m a good guy”, the intention of this utterance is to show that the speaker is to make believe the hearer that the speaker is a good guy. 


Locutionary, Illocutionary, Perlocutionary Speech Acts

According to Austin (1962) in his speech acts theory, there are three actions related to speech acts. The first act is locutionary act which is the basic production of meaningful utterance. This act is much related to the hearer, if the hearer fails to understand what the speaker is saying then the speaker has failed to do a locutionary act . For example, when a person from Indonesia (he's in America for instance) talks to an American in bahasa 'apa kabar pak?' in English this utterance will not produce what is called as a meaningful linguistic expression. On the contrary when the speaker said 'how are you sir?' then the American would understand and it is a form of locutionary act. (see more simple examples of locutionary acts) 
In uttering a sentence or word, one must have a certain intention. Most of the time people produce well-formed utterances for a purpose, for instance the need to communicate something to someone or to provide facts. This second dimension is called Illocutionary act. An illocutionary act is accomplished via utterance with a communicative intention. A speaker may perform illocutionary act to make a promise, offer, explanation, etc, which is as proposed by Austin as illocutionary force. (see more examples of illocutionary acts)
In indicating illocutionary act Searle develops a device called Illocutionary Force Indicating Device (IFID).  It is an expression to show the illocutionary force of an utterance is. For example, in the utterance
[1.5] ‘I promise you this’
The word ‘promise’ in [1.5] is identified as performative verb which is one of the devices to identify illocutionary force. It is obviously indicated that the illocutionary force of the speaker is to promise something to the hearer as the speaker describes it explicitly. Sometimes one doesn’t explicitly mention their intention explicitly. When this happens another IFID can be used to identify the illocutionary force of the speaker. These are word orders, intonations, and stresses.
[1.6 a] You’re going!
[1.6 b] You’re going?
[1.6 c] Are you going?
In these utterances can be indicated that the illocutionary force of [1.6 a] is to tell or make decision, while [1.6 b] is requesting confirmation and [1.6 c] is asking about the hearer’s activity in the near future (emphasizing in word order difference).
            While locutionary act is the action of making a meaningful utterance and illocutionary act is performing an intentional utterance, perlocutionary act talks about producing the effect of the meaningful, intentional utterance. While making utterance that intent to make someone to drink coffee is successfully performed, the effect is that someone actually drank the coffee is also known as perlocutionary effect. Another example is when a boy says to a girl “You’re beautiful”, if the girl is attracted to the boy usually the girl will blush and feel happy; but on the contrary, if the girl is not attracted to the speaker, then usually she will only say “Thank you” and don’t feel as happy as in the first case. (more examples of perlocutionary acts).
In conclusion, locutionary act is the production of meaningful utterances and expressions (“go away!”, “come here”, “who are you?”, etc) which leads to illocutionary act, the intention of producing meaningful expression (promise, offering, etc), which causes the performance of perlocutionary act, which is the effect of the locutionary and illocutionary act (behavior, feeling, belief, etc).
See also:

Speech Acts Theory Explained with Examples

In communicating themselves people often uses utterances as a tool. These utterances sometimes perform something more than just a sound, or just a mere expression. The theory of speech acts was first established by the philosopher of language, J.L Austin (1962). He states that statements can not only be used to describe or state some facts. On the contrary, some actions can be done through words. He then developed a theory of performative sentence or performative utterances or performatives, which are utterances that do not only passively describe a fact but also perform an act and change the reality. In performative utterances or speech acts Austin believes that there is no true or false, but rather liked or not, void or not void. Some examples of performative utterances:

[1.1].When a bride on the altar said: 'I do'.

[1.2]. When a friend said: 'I bet twenty bucks he will lose'

[1.3] When someone calls 'shotgun' before a car ride

None of these utterances are true or false, neither have they described what the speaker is doing, yet it performs and acts of accepting ([1.1]) and betting ([1.2]). When the bride says 'I do' on the altar to the priest, the bride is not describing herself or a fact but she indulge herself into the marriage. Moreover, when a friend says [1.2], the performance of this utterance is as a proposal which suppose that when someone put a coin into a slot machine and when the taker accepts the bet by simply saying 'sure' or 'I take it’ then it's like the person is pulling the lever to see the outcome of the bet.

Austin categorizes two types of performatives, explicit performatives and implicit performatives (which also recognized as primary performatives). The distinction between these two categories is the use of a particular word. Explicit performance usually uses the word ‘hereby’ so that it sounded true. The word ’hereby’ act as the producer of action in the utterance. Examples: 

[I.3]. I hereby tell you to turn off the lamp.

[I.4]. Turn off the lamp!

 These examples distinguish the difference between implicit and explicit performatives. The sentence uttered in [I.3] is obviously an example of explicit performatives as it contains the word ‘hereby’. Of course, this kind of utterance is rarely used nowadays which makes the implicit performatives as the most widely used as in [I.4].


Searle and speech acts

Later, another linguistic philosopher, John R. Searle, developed the theory of speech acts. In Searle’s definition, Speech acts are the basic or smallest form of linguistic communication. He also hypothesize that speaking a language is engaging in a rule-governed form of behavior (Searle, p16).  In accordance to Searle (1969), the units of linguistic communication is not the symbol, word or sentences but rather it is the production of the symbol, words or sentences. He pointed out that language is part of theory of action as language is a form of intentional, rule-governed behavior. To support his hypothesis he emphasize the fact that when someone is making noise with a paper as an example of communication, a message to other, then his action of making noise with the paper was made with certain intention and to be distinguished from natural phenomenon such as rain or waterfall.

 

Utterance and speech acts

The definition of speech acts is often related to utterance. According to Yule (1996), speech acts is defined as actions that are performed via utterances. In English, speech acts are usually named as promise, request, apology, compliment, invitation, et cetera. These terms describe the use of speech acts in daily human activity. There are three Types of Speech Acts developed by Austin (1962). These are locutionary, illocutionary, perlocutionary acts, which is brought into detail in the next section.


See also:

Locutionary, Illocutionary, Perlocutionary SpeechActs
Speech Acts Classifications
Felicity Condition
Indirect Speech Acts   

Examples of locutionary acts

Examples of illocutionary acts

Examples of perlocutionary acts

Performative and Constative speech acts 

Summary of How to Do Things With Words by J.L.Austin 

Derrida and Specch Act Theory

 

Monday, January 1, 2018

Summary: Chapter 15 in What Is This Thing Called Science? / Alan Chalmers


What Is This Thing Called Science? / Alan Chalmers
Chapter 15:Realism and anti- realism

-          Realism = science describes not just the observable world but also the world that lies behind the appearances
-          Doubts abut realism: extent to which claims about the unobservable world must be hypothetical to the extent that they do transcend what can be firmly established on the basis of observation
Global anti-realism
-          We are trapped within language and cannot break out of it to describe reality directly in a way that is independent of our theories
-          (Realist) correspondence theory of truth = a sentence is truth if and only if it corresponds to the facts
-          Liar paradox: e.g. I never tell the truth
-          Tarski: avoid paradoxes by distinguishing the object language (is being talked about) from the meta-language (in which the talking is done)
-           A theory is true if the world is as the theory says it is and false otherwise
-          Should scientific theories be taken as candidates for truth or as making claims about the observable world only? Neither side supports global anti-realism
Anti-realism
-          Instrumentalists: theories are just useful instruments to predict results
-          Van Fraassen is not an instrumentalist for theories can be true or false, but the merit is judged in terms of its generality and simplicity and the extent to which it leads to new observations à constructive empiricism
-          Motivation of anti-realism = desire to restrict science to those claims that can be justified by scientific means. Evaluate theories solely in terms of their ability to order and predict observable phenomena
-          Theories can be discarded when they have outlived their usefulness, and the experimental and observational discoveries to which they have led retained
Objections and anti-realists response
-          Distinction between knowledge at the observational level (securely established) and is best seen as an heuristic aid à problem: theory dependence and fallibility of observation and experiment
-          Theories that are predictively successful have to be more or less true and not just instruments à response anti-realists: fact that a theory is productive need be no indication that it is true (historical proof)
-          Anti-realists insist that theories must be general and unified – embrace a wide range of phenomena
-          The unobservable has no place in science or should be treated merely as useful fiction (e.g. atomic theory) à response: only part of science that is subject to confirmation by observation and experiment should be treated as candidates for truth and falsity, but as science progresses and better instruments and experimental techniques are devised à range of claims that can be subject to confirmation is extended
Scientific realism
-          Science aims at true statements about what there is in the world and how it behaves at all levels. Science has made progress to this aim
-          Impossible to know that current theories are true, but they are truer than earlier theories
-          Hacking: pay attention to what can be practically manipulated in science. Entities in science can be shown to be real once they can be manipulated in a controlled way and used to bring about effects in something else
Conjectural realism (Karl Popper)
-          Theories of the past have been falsified and replaced by superior theories
-           Problem: weakness of its claims. Science aims to achieve truth and there are ways to recognize how it falls short of this aim (there is no truth)
Structural realism
-          Middle ground realism and anti-realism: realist in that it attempt to characterizes the structure of reality: more and more capable. Representations are replaced over time
Idealization
-          Duhem: theories cannot be taken as literal descriptions of reality because theoretical descriptions are idealized in a way that the world is not

-          Theoretical and observational knowledge
additional summaries in  philosophy of science

Some books about philosophy of science to consider:

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Summary: Chapter 9 in What Is This Thing Called Science? / Alan Chalmers

What Is This Thing Called Science? / Alan Chalmers
Chapter 9: Theories as structures: Research programs


-          Commonalities Kuhn and Popper:
o   Reject positivism and inductivism
o   Priority to theory over observation
-          Lakatos set out to modify falsificationism to rid it of its difficulties and does so by drawing on some of Kuhn’s ideas.
-          Fundamental principles = hard core of a research program à basis from which the program is to develop, general hypotheses
-          Any inadequacy in the match between an articulated program and observation is to be attributed to the supplementary assumptions rather than the hard core
-          Protective belt = sum of additional hypotheses supplementing the hard core à its role is to protect the hard core from falsification
-          Assumptions in the protective belt are to be modified in an attempt to improve the research program (the match of its predictions and the actual results of observation and experiment)
-          Negative heuristic = what the scientist should not do
-          Positive heuristic = what the scientist should do, suggestions on how to sophisticate the protective belt
-          Early work in a research program takes place in spite of apparent falsifications. In this early stage confirmations rather than falsifications are of paramount significance
-          Indication of the merit of a program > extent to which it leads to novel predictions that are confirmed
-          Progressive research program = retains its coherence and at least intermittently leads to novel predictions that are confirmed
-          Degenerating program = loses its coherence and/or fails to lead to confirmed new predictions
-          Scientific revolution for Lakatos: the replacement of a degenerating program by a progressive one
Methodology within a program and the comparison of programs
-          No ad hoc modifications
-          Modifications or additions to the protective belt must be independently testable and open up opportunity for new tests
-          Impossible to do research that departs from the hard core
-          Novel predictions: one program is superior to another insofar as it is a more successful predictor of novel phenomena
-          Support Quine/Durkheim thesis
-          Not irrational to remain working on a degenerating program if there are possible ways to bring it to life again
-          Appraisal of research programs can only be done with historical hindsight
Problems with Lakatos’s methodology
-          Hard core of a program is rendered unfalsifiable by the methodological decisions of its protagonists à lack of evidence of those rational decisions and yet they are the locus of distinction between his position and that of Kuhn
-          Methodology can only make judgments whether a program is scientific or not with the benefit of historical hindsight àno position to diagnose a contemporary program

-          Support with history of science but only that of physics, assumed that other fields share the characteristics of physics à problematic because especially in the social sciences, knowledge produced itself is a component of the system that is studied, so a change in theory can bring about a change in the system
additional summaries in  philosophy of science

Some books about philosophy of science to consider:

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Summary: Chapter 8 in What Is This Thing Called Science? / Alan Chalmers

What Is This Thing Called Science? / Alan Chalmers
Chapter 8: Theories as structures: Kuhn’s paradigms

-          In his "Structure of Scientific Revolutions" Kuhn describes the progress of science
o   Pre-science à normal science à crisis à revolution à new normal science à new crisis
-          Existence of a paradigm capable of supporting a normal science tradition is the characteristic that distinguishes science from non-science
-          Mature science is governed by a single paradigm
-          Normal science as puzzle-solving activity governed y the rules of a paradigm
-          Lack of agreement over fundamental distinguishes mature science from disorganized immature pre-science
-          Mere existence of unresolved puzzles does not constitute a crisis
-          When anomalies come to be seen as posing serious problems for a paradigm à crisis which is deepened with the appearance of an incompatible rival paradigm. Rival paradigms are incommensurable
-          Scientific revolution: abandonment of one paradigm and the adoption by a new one by the relevant scientific community as a whole
-          Importance attached to the role played by the sociological characteristics of scientific communities
-          Function of revolutions: a means of breaking out of one paradigm into a better one
-          Progress through revolutions: alternative to cumulative progress
-          A discipline in which fundamentals are constantly brought into question (critical rationalism) is unlikely to make significant progress simply because principles do not remain unchallenged long enough for esoteric work to be done
Kuhn’s ambivalence on progress through revolutions
-          Relativist position: the question of whether a paradigm is better or not than the one it challenges does not have a definitive neutral answer, but depends on the values of those who make the judgment
-          Kuhn rejects the relativist position: later theories are better than earlier ones for solving puzzles in the different environments to which they are applied à convinced believer in scientific progress
-          Two incompatible strands: the relativist position and the alternative (how can a paradigm be said to constitute progress over the one it replaces?)
Objective knowledge
-          How can a paradigm change take place all at once, but not necessarily in an instant?
-          Distinction objective and subjective knowledge
-          Knowledge is a state of mind
-          Knowledge in the subjective sense: individual knowledge/experiences
-          Knowledge in the objective sense: distinct from the kinds of things that reside in individual minds, observation statements are publicly testable and debatable
-          Objective relationships exist between parts of the structure independently of whether individuals are aware of that relationship
-          Similar to Karl Popper’s world 3
-          A particular paradigm can be an improvement on its rival? à question about the objective relation between paradigms
-          On subjective knowledge: gestalt switches à should be removed from Kuhn’s account for it leads to the confusion and understanding of Kuhn as a relativist
additional summaries in  philosophy of science

Some books about philosophy of science to consider:

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Summary: Chapter 5-7 in What Is This Thing Called Science? / Alan Chalmers

What Is This Thing Called Science? / Alan Chalmers
Chapter 5-7

Chapter 5: Introducing falsification

-          Falsification is logical
-          A hypothesis must be falsifiable
-          A falsified theory must be rejected
-          Science progresses by trial and error
-          Theories should be clearly stated, precise and informative
-          Theories are never true, although they can be superior to predecessors that have been falsified
-          Science starts with problems that arise from observations

Chapter 6: Sophisticated falsification

-          Hypothesis must be more falsifiable than the one it replaces
-          Number of potential falsifiers is infinite
-          Theory is falsified if another theory:
o   Has more empirical content over old theory
o   Includes unrefuted content of old theory
o   New content is supported by empirical and observation
-          Ad hoc modifications are unacceptable as it only reduces the number of potential falsifiers
-          Modified theories that lead to new independently testable tests
-          Significant advances will be marked by
o   Confirmation (verification) of bold conjectures as such conjectures can falsify, some part, of the background knowledge
o   Falsification of cautious conjectures
-          Bold and novel are historically relative notions

Chapter 7: Limitations of falsification

-          Inconsistency: evidence/observation may be at fault rather than the theory itself à no ground to reject theory
-          Realistic scientific theory consists of:
o   Auxiliary assumptions
o   Initial conditions
-          Durkheim/Quine thesis: if the prediction is false, then it is either the theory, the auxiliary assumptions or the initial conditions that are responsible for the erroneous prediction
-          Theory can be protected from falsification by deflecting it to some other part of the web of assumptions
-          Falsification encourages bold statements
-          Need for dogmatism: do not reject theories too easily/ give into criticisms
-          What is left of falsificationism once dogmatism is allowed a key role?

Other notes

-          Knowledge = a conjecture/statements that are falsifiable and have not been falsified yet
-          To falsify is to ask the question: can I think of an event that would falsify my theory?

Back to:  What Is This Thing Called Science? / Alan Chalmers
additional summaries in  philosophy of science

Some books about philosophy of science to consider:

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