Sunday, March 19, 2017

Hegel on the Absolute - Summary

One of the key concept's of Hegel's philosophy is that of the Absolute. The Absolute is the whole of reality, the whole universe, Hegel is not saying that the Absolute is infinite “substance” (as it was for Spinoza) for Hegel also means that the Absolute is not only substance but subject as well. But if the Absolute is subject what is its object? The only answer can be that it is itself the object – that is, thought thinks itself, self-thinking thought. To say that the Absolute is Spirit is to say that it is infinite self-luminous or self-conscious subject. This is what Absolute as Spirit means: self-conscious, self-thinking infinite subject.

The question that may be raised is: is this not Aristotle’s definition of God? Yes, but Hegel this Absolute Spirit is not a transcendent deity (above/outside reality); rather it is the whole of reality as process. That is, the Absolute is a process of self-reflection and so reality (Absolute) comes to know itself through the human spirit. Now, as we have seen in Fichte, nature is a necessary precondition for human consciousness; the objective without which the subjective does not exist. But for Hegel both the objective and the subjective are both moments in the life of the Absolute. Thus, nature is not real in a subjectivist sense; it is the Absolute expressed objectively. The philosophical reflection of humanity is the Absolute’s self-knowledge. Thus, the history of philosophy (of thought) is the process whereby the Absolute, reality as a whole, comes to think itself. In philosophical reason we see the whole history of the cosmos and the whole history of humankind as the self-unfolding of the Absolute – and it is the Absolute’s knowledge of itself.

So Hegel agrees with Aristotle that God is self-thinking thought and that this self-thinking thought is the telos which draws the world as final cause, but whereas Aristotle’s self-thinking thought (prime mover) is already self-conscious and does not depend on the world, Hegel’s self-thinking thought is not a transcendent reality but rather the universe’s (totality) knowledge of itself. The whole process of reality is a teleological movement towards the actualization of self-thinking thought. In other words, the Absolute is immanent in process coming to think itself.

Self-thinking thought is the identity of the real and ideal, of subjectivity and objectivity, even as this identity is definitely not an undifferentiated identity. Spirit sees itself in nature as the objective manifestation of the Absolute which is a necessary condition of the Absolute’s own existence. In other words, the Absolute which knows itself as the totality, as the whole process of becoming, is at the same time aware of distinctions in its own life. It knows identity-in-difference as the unity which comprises distinguishable phases within itself. Philosophy is then charged with the task of understanding this life of the Absolute. This is to say that philosophy must exhibit systematically the rational dynamic structure, the teleological process, of the movement of Reason in both the sphere of nature and in the sphere of human spirit, which then culminates in the Absolute’s knowledge of itself. But be careful this task of philosophy does not mean that philosophy must do what science and history already do, rather the knowledge of science and history is presupposed and then philosophy’s task is to make clear the teleological process which is immanent in both scientific and historical knowledge – exhibiting the self-realization of infinite Reason through the finite process of science, and of history.

If infinite Reason actualizes itself in the sphere of nature and the sphere of human spirit (history) then we can distinguish between the eternal Idea and the field of its actualization (both in nature and human spirit). The Idea or Logos then goes over into nature as objectivity as the antithesis of the Idea, but in the sphere of the human spirit – history – Logos returns to itself in that it is in this sphere that it manifests itself as it really is. Hence the Absolute comprises three phases (of its rational dynamic teleological structure in history): the

(1) Idea/Concept/notion,
(2) the sphere of nature, and
(3) the sphere of Spirit.

Similarly philosophy falls into three domains:

(1) logic (metaphysics –studying the Absolute in itself),
(2) philosophy of nature, and
(3) philosophy of Spirit.

When Hegel talks about the eternal Idea manifesting itself as nature and spirit he implies that the Logos possesses an ontological status of its own, independent of things. When he does so he frequently invokes the language of religion and speaks of the logos as of God and so gives the impression that the Logos is a transcendent reality manifesting itself in nature. But as we have seen this cannot be so since he rejects, for example, Aristotle’s prime mover and the Judaic-Christian concept of a God as a being outside creation). But the religious language is not accurate here and it is difficult to decide whether the Logos indeed does have an independent ontological status. In any case, philosophy studies

(1) the Absolute “in itself”,
(2) Absolute in Nature “for-itself”, and
(3) the Absolute in Spirit (“in and for itself” in history).

Together they constitute the complete construction of the life of the Absolute. It is the task of philosophy to exhibit this life of the Absolute in conceptual form, that is, as a necessary process of self-actualization - a necessity that is reflected in the philosophical system.

Thus, philosophy (contra religion) must exhibit the life of the Absolute in conceptual form – as a process of self-actualization reflected in the philosophical system which is the whole truth and a faithful reflection of the Absolute. It is in fact the Absolute’s knowledge of itself through the human mind – a self-mediated totality – which would be a self-mediation of the Totality. Hence on Hegel’s view there is no question of comparing absolute philosophy with the Absolute, as though the Absolute were purely external to an account of the latter; rather, absolute philosophy would be the Absolute’s knowledge of itself. [That is, the history of thought – of philosophical reflection –is the Absolute’s knowledge of itself.]

But if we say that philosophy must exhibit the life of the Absolute in conceptual form, there at once arises a difficulty. As we have seen, the Absolute is identity-in-difference (e.g., of the infinite and the finite, the One and the Many) but the concept of the infinite and the finite would seem to be mutually exclusive. If philosophy is to exhibit the life of the Absolute conceptually how can it do so in concepts of the understanding that are always mutually exclusive? And even if we allow that its concepts are not well-defined how can we understand the life of the Absolute? Would it not be better to say with Schelling that the Absolute simply transcends conceptual thought?

In fact, for Hegel this problem does arise at the level of understanding (Verstand) since Verstand posits fixed and static concepts, but of course Verstand is inadequate for speculative philosophy. Hegel affirms that Verstand is important in life (to maintain clarity of concepts of, say, the real and ideal) and science is generally based on Verstand. But philosophy when it tries to grasp the life of the Absolute it must pass beyond the opposite concepts (binary concepts) of Verstand such that thinking becomes dialectical. That is, the mind must penetrate deeper into the concepts (which are categories of reality) and it will then see that concepts pass over and into, or call forth, their opposites. For example, if the mind really tries to think through the concept of the infinite, this concept loses its rigid and self-contained-ness and the concept of the finite emerges. Similarly, when the mind tries to think through the concept of reality as opposed to appearance it will see the absurd or contradictory character of a reality that does not appear or manifests (appear) itself. Again for practical commonsense these concepts are distinct – one thing is distinct from another, and each thing is self-identical, and this is useful – but once we really try to think it we see the absurdity of the notion of a completely isolated thing, and we are forced to negate the original negation.

Thus, in speculative philosophy the mind must elevate itself from the level of understanding to the level of dialectical thinking which overcomes the rigidity of the concepts of understanding and sees one concept as passing into its opposite. Only then can it hope to grasp the life of the Absolute in which one moment or phase necessarily passes into another. But obviously if this dialectic is to work then the opposite concepts must have a higher unity or synthesis which annuls their difference. This is the function of reason (Vernunft) to grasp this identity-in-difference. Hence philosophy demands that the understanding is elevated through dialectical thinking to the level of reason (speculative thought) which is capable of apprehending identity-in-difference.

From Hegel’s perspective this is not a question of producing a new logic out of which he then establishes a preconceived view of reality; he sincerely believes that dialectical thought (reason) allows for a deeper penetration of the nature of reality than does the understanding which only distinguishes things (only makes distinctions). For example, for Hegel it is not a question of insisting that the concept of the finite must pass over into the concept of the infinite simply because of a preconceived belief that the infinite exists in and through the finite, rather, it is his conviction that we cannot really the think the finite at all without relating it to the infinite. Hence, it is not we who do something to the concept (juggling about with it) it is rather the concept itself which loses rigidity and breaks up before the mind’s (subject’s) attentive gaze – and this reveals the nature of the finite.

Hegel has been accused of denying the principle of non-contradiction by suggesting that contradictory concepts (e.g., infinite vs finite) stand together. Hegel reply is that it is precisely in not being satisfied with sheer contradiction (opposition) which forces the mind onwards towards a higher synthesis in which contradiction is overcome. Yet Hegel objected to Fichte claim that contradictions were merely apparent, Hegel argues contradictions are real. Thus the contradictory concepts are preserved in their dialectical synthesis even if not in a relation of mutual exclusiveness (binary opposites); rather, they are shown to be essential and complementary in a higher synthesis wherein the contradiction is resolved. Hence, the principle of non-contradiction (logic) is given dynamic formulation in Hegel as a principle of movement of reason (rather than the stasic concepts of binary opposites which the understanding yields).

In fact, Hegel does not use the word contradiction in a consistent way. Thus, occasionally we find a verbal contradiction. Such as when the concept of Being is said to pass into or give rise to the concept of Not-being, while the concept of Not-being passes into the concept of Being. This dialectical oscillation then gives rise to the concept of Becoming which synthesizes Being and Not-being. But the meaning of this dialectical performance is easily intelligible (whether we agree with it or not). In any case, Hegel’s contradictions are more like contraries – wherein a one-sided abstraction evokes another which is then overcome in synthesis.

The word synthesis is used for the moment of identity-in-difference in a dialectical movement/advance (which is not merely the movement of reason but the movement of Spirit historically). In point of fact, the words thesis, antithesis and synthesis is more characteristic of Fichte than Hegel who seldom uses these words. At the same time, Hegel is obsessed by triads. Thus, in the construction of the Absolute there are three phases: Idea, Nature, and Spirit. Each phase is in turn divided into three. Moreover, the entire system aims at a necessary development. That is, for philosophical reflection one stage reveals itself as demanding the next stage by inner necessity. Thus in theory at least, if we start with the first category of logic, the inner necessity of dialectical development forces the mind to proceed not simply to the final category of logic but also to the ultimate phase of philosophy of Spirit.

This obsession with triads is made even more problematic when Hegel claims that philosophy is necessarily a deductive system of thought (not in the sense of a computing machine for then it would be the product of understanding and not reason). But obviously when he claims that philosophy is concerned with the life of Absolute Spirit (philosophy), to discern the unfolding of this life in history, say, apriori deduction is not sufficient, after all the material stuff is not supplied by philosophy but interpreted by philosophy in terms of a teleological pattern which works itself out in the material realm. At the same time the whole dialectical movement of the Hegelian system should, in theory at least, impose itself on the mind by its own inner necessity – otherwise the system could not be its own justification. Yet it is also clear that Hegel comes to philosophy with certain basic convictions:

(1) that the rational is real and the real rational,
(2) that reality is a self-manifestation of infinite reason, and
(3) that infinite reason is self-thinking Thought which actualizes itself in the historical process.

Of course Hegel claims that the truth of these convictions must be demonstrated (validated) in the system but it is also arguable that the system depends on these prior convictions.

One could simply interpret Hegel’ theory of the necessity inherent in the dialectical development of the system, as simply one way in which his philosophy satisfies the impulse of the human mind to attain conceptual mastery over the whole wealth of empirical data or to interpret the world as a whole and man’s relation to it. We could then compare this system to other whole systems (say materialism/positivism or evolutionism). But Hegel precludes this procedure since it does not square with his own estimation of his philosophy. For even if he did not think his system was the final form of the system, he did think it represented the highest stage which the Absolute’s developing knowledge has reached up to date (so precluding comparison to other total systems).

This may seem bizarre but we have to keep in mind Hegel’s view of the Absolute as identity-in-difference. The infinite exists in and through the finite and infinite Reason or Spirit knows itself in and through the finite spirit and mind of individual human beings. However, importantly, it is not every sort of finite thinking that develops this self-knowledge of the infinite (obviously, otherwise we would never get to the Absolute). Rather it is human being’s knowledge of the Absolute that is identical with the Absolute’s knowledge of itself even as we can never say that any finite mind’s knowledge of the Absolute is identical with the Absolute’s knowledge of itself. The Absolute’s knowledge of itself transcends any set of finite minds.

We can therefore speak of the human mind rising to participate in self-knowledge of the Absolute. This can be interpreted along theistic line (that is, e.g., while God is perfectly luminous to himself and independent of human beings, human beings are capable of participating in God’s self-knowledge). But Father Copelston suggests that human being’s knowledge of the Absolute and the Absolute’s knowledge of itself are two distinct aspects of the same reality. But even on this interpretation we can still speak of the finite mind rising to participate in divine self-knowledge, after all, not every sort of idea and thought in man’s mind can be regarded as a moment in the Absolute’s self-knowledge. To achieve this, the finite mind has to rise to the level of what Hegel calls absolute knowledge.
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Hegel on Idealism, Fichte and Schelling

In 1802 Hegel published his comparison of Idealist thinkers Fichte and Schelling (Differences between the philosophical systems of  Fichte and Schelling). He showed that Schelling was an advance on Fichte and in the process Hegel develops his own thought.

Hegel maintains that the fundamental task/purpose of philosophy is to reconcile oppositions and divisions (which are always the product of human understanding, see for example in his "Fragments of aSystem"). In the world of experience, the mind finds only oppositions, contradictions, differences and philosophy according to Hegel seeks to overcome these in different cultural-historical epochs (e.g., soul and body, subject and object, intelligence and nature, etc). Whatever the differences, it is the role of reason to overcome these. That is, the Absolute is to be constructed for consciousness – for synthesis of oppositions must in the long run involve reality as a whole.

Of course if the life of the Absolute is to be constructed, we must do so in reflection and the problem with reflection is that it functions as understanding (Verstand) and hence it posits even more differences and oppositions. Understanding must therefore be united with transcendental (intellectual) intuition which discovers the interpenetration of ideal and real, idea and being, subject and object, and soul and body. So that reflection (Verstand) is raised to the level of reason (Vernunft), and we have knowledge that is conceived of as the identity of Verstand and Vernunft – this was Schelling.

Hegel was also sympathetic with Fichte’s efforts to overcome the dualisms in Kant. Hegel too does away with the thing-in-itself – and he does so in the way both Fichte and Schelling do namely by invoking intellectual intuition (or the identity of subject and object). In science this identity/intuition becomes the topic of reflection, and in philosophy intellectual intuition makes itself its own object and hence is one with it – it is speculation, and Fichte philosophy is the product of speculation/reason. But while Fichte begins with the principle of identity, it is not how his system is constructed. In consciousness only the idea of an objective world (non-ego) is deduced and not the world itself, and we are left in Fichte only with subjectivity (not identity). We are indeed presented with the real world, but nature is only posited as the opposite of the ego – in other words we are left, in Fichte, with a dualism (this is Hegel’s critique of Fichte).

Here is where Schelling comes in. For Schelling the principle of identity is the absolute principle of the whole system. Here philosophy and system coincide: identity is not lost in its parts. That is, Schelling begins with the idea of the Absolute as identity and it persists in the guiding idea of the parts of the system. Thus nature is not simply the opposite of the ideal, but it is, though real, also ideal through and through – nature is visible spirit – and the principle of identity is maintained throughout the whole system.
Transcendental idealism shows how subjectivity objectifies itself; how the ideal is also real.

But Hegel also distinguishes himself from Schelling's Idealism for it is clear that intellectual intuition does not mean mystical intuition of the dark and impenetrable abyss, as the vanishing point of all differences. Rather it is reason’s insight into differences (antitheses) as moments in the one all comprehensive life of the absolute. Thus, in his Jena lectures, Hegel argues that the finite and infinite are set over against each other and there is no passage (synthesis) between them. But in point of fact we cannot think the finite without also thinking the infinite (the concept of the finite is not self-contained but is limited by what is other than itself) and, using Hegel’s language, the finite is not simple negation (of the infinite). Hence, we must negate the negation (the finite is the opposite/negation of the infinite) and in doing so we affirm that the finite is always more than the finite. Thus the finite is a moment in the life of the infinite and from this it follows that to construct the life of the Absolute (which is the task of philosophy) we must do so through the finite showing how the Absolute expresses itself necessarily as Spirit, as self-consciousness in and through the human mind. For the human mind though finite is at the same time more than finite and can attain the standpoint at which it becomes the vehicle of the Absolute’s knowledge of itself.

This is in harmony to some extent with Schelling but there is also a major difference. For Schelling the Absolute transcends conceptual thought and so we must approach the Absolute negatively by thinking away its attributes and distinctions of the finite. In contrast, for Hegel the Absolute is a process of self-expression/manifestation in and through the finite. Hence, in the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel rejects Schelling view of the Absolute. This was also the break between Hegel and Schelling. Hegel rejects Schelling’s monotonous formalism and abstract universality (Absolute) as vacuous (“in the night in which all cows are black”). For Hegel the Absolute is not impenetrable, it does not exist above or behind its determinate manifestation: rather it is its manifestation.

This point is crucial for understanding Hegel’s philosophy and Idealism. The subject matter of philosophy is the Absolute, and the Absolute is to the totality (reality as a whole or the universe). Philosophy is concerned with the true and the true is the whole. This totality is the whole and it is infinite life in a process of development – or a circle that presupposes its end as its purpose and has its end as its beginning. The Absolute becomes concrete or actual through its development and through its end. Reality is then a teleological process, and the ideal presupposes its whole process and its significance. Philosophy must try to systematically understand this teleological process - as scientific system.

  
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Hegel - Fragments of a System - Summary

In 1800 Hegel published Fragment of a System. Here Hegel struggles with the problem of overcoming oppositions especially between the finite and infinite. As spectators, life appears as nature given to our understanding, but nature is transitory and therefore thought thinks nature in terms of unity with the infinite. This creative unity of nature and the infinite is not a conceptual abstraction but is God (and must also be defined as Spirit since it is neither an external link between finite things, nor a purely abstract concept or abstract universal). Rather infinite life unites all finite things from within, however without annihilating them. Infinite life or Spirit is a living unity of the manifold.

Hegel use of the word ‘Spirit’ (German: "Geist") is important to the development of his philosophy. The question is whether we can conceptually unify the finite and infinite without dissolving either. Hegel in Fragment of a system maintains that is not possible. The gulf between the finite and infinite inevitably tends to merge and so reduce one to the other while, if it affirms their unity, it inevitable tends to deny their distinction. We can see the necessity for a synthesis in which the unity does not exclude its distinctions – but the question is whether we can think that? Unifying the One and the Many within the One without dissolving the Many can be achieved only in living, and not in thinking….this is religion. In this sense philosophy is subordinate to religion. Philosophy can show us what is required but it cannot think it. Here Hegel turns to the Christian religion – because the Jews objectified God as being above and outside the finite (which Hegel calls “bad infinity”) but Christ discovered infinite life within himself – hence the unity can only be lived as Christ lived in a life of love.

For Hegel, Overcoming the finite and infinite without losing either is love, not thought. Yet it is the task of philosophy to try to think what religion lives and to accomplish this philosophy must avail itself of a new logic – one that is able to follow the course of life and does not leave opposed concepts in irremediable opposition. This new logic marks Hegel’s transition from theologian to philosopher. 
  
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Hegel on Religion, Christianity, Morality and Ethics - Summary

Hegel was a deeply religious philosopher who had do settle his Christianity with the rationality of his times. Hegel rejected the Theistic Rationalism which he compared unfavorably to the Greek spirit of religion. Hegel thought of the Bible as a product of an alien race out of harmony with the German soul. His point was that the Greek religion was a Volksreligion whereas Christianity seemed something imposed from without. Hegel’s affection for Greek culture and religion was soon modified by Kant (which led him to see the lack of profundity in Greek religion) because Kant expounded an ethics free from religion. Hegel liked Kant ethics and thought it had much in common with Jesus (Life of Jesus, 1795) depicting Christ as a moral teacher and an expounder of Kantian ethics. Thus, he rejected a view of Christ as a mediator between God and man and as imposing revealed dogma (which if Jesus did, it was not his intent).

The question then arises how did Christianity become transformed into an authoritarian, ecclesiastical, and dogmatic system (see The Positivity of the Christian religion, 1795-97) which alienated man from his true self by eliminating freedom of thought and freedom of action? Later Hegel made Judaic legalism the villain (see The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate, 1800). Here we have the Jewish God as master and man as slave. In contrast, Jesus preached Christ-God as love which could overcome the alienation of man from God. Jesus rises above Jewish legalism and Kantian moralism: according to Hegel, morality should not be imposed but rise spontaneously as an expression of man’s participation in the infinite divine life.

Here we already see the themes that would occupy Hegel later: alienation and recovery of lost unity. When he compared Judaism and Christianity he was already unhappy with a remote transcendent God and adhered to a notion of feeling for infinite totality. The Absolute is infinite life and love and the Absolute is the conscious unity of this life, of unity with the infinite and unity with others. Note the effort after “wholeness” so alien to scientific materialism, empiricism, individualism, and instrumental reason.

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Hegel - Overview of Philosophy and Summaries

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) is probably the greatest German idealist and one of the outstanding philosophers of Western thought. He sets himself to address the problem of the Absolute (God) or infinite and the relation between the finite and infinite. Hegel's first major work in 1801 when he was at Jena (called the Jena lectures). He compared the writings of Schelling and Fichte and hence gave the impression that he was a disciple of Schelling. With Schelling Hegel edited the Critical Journal of Philosophy (1802-03), but his lectures at Jena (which were not published until the 20th c.) already established his independence from Schelling which became clear with the publication of his famous Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). The Battle of Jena (where Napoleon won) led to his poverty and eventually a job as Director of the Gymnasium at Nuremberg until 1816 where he also produced the Science of Logic (1812-16).

Following the publication of the second volume, Hegel accepted a position at Heidelberg where he published Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817) in which he presented the main divisions of philosophy: logic, nature, and spirit. At Heidelberg Hegel also lectured on aesthetics.

In 1818 Hegel went to Berlin until his death of cholera in 1831. Here he wrote Outlines of the Philosophy of Right (1821), new edition of the Encyclopedia (1827-30), and was revising the Phenomenology of Spirit. His lectures were eventually published in four volumes on religion and history of philosophy (3 volumes each) and one volume on the philosophy of history.

Summaries of Hegel's works and ideas (best read in succession):

Hegel - Overview of Philosophy and Summaries
Hegel on Religion, Christianity, Morality and Ethics
Hegel - Fragments of a System
Hegel on Idealism, Fichte and Schelling
Hegel on the Absolute 
Hegel - Phenomenology of Spirit
Hegel On Self-Consciousness
Hegel on Master-Slave Dialectic
Hegel on Universal Consciousness and Reason
Georg Hegel on the History of Philosophy 
The Speculative Good Friday: Hegel’s "Death of God" and the Birth of Spirit

To start reading Hegel on your own check out our Hegel reading list and guide.


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Michel Foucault on Technologies of Power - Summary



Michel Foucault discusses the topic of technologies of power in the chapter titled “The Body of the Condemned” in his book  Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison.

Technology of power according to Foucault is the very principle of both the humanization of the penal system and of the knowledge of man (related to his notions of power/knowledge and discipline).

Foucault argues that the history of the penal law and the history of the human sciences derive from a common matrix.

According to Foucault the body itself is invested by power relations. The body is a useful force only if it is both a productive body and a subjected body.

In all forms of punishment, the body is at issue: the body and its forces, their utility and docility, and their distribution and submission. Technologies of power always perform their acts on the body, disciplining it.

"Microphysics of power" is another  key term in Foucault's concept of technologies of power. according to Foucault power exercised on the body is not a property, but a strategy; its effects of domination are attributed not to appropriation, but to dispositions, maneuvers, tactics, techniques. This power is exercised, it is not possessed; it is not the privilege of the dominant class, but an overall effect of its strategic positions.

This power invests the people who “do not have power,” it is transmitted through them and by them. At the same time, people resist the grip of this power.

Body Politic according to Foucault is a set of material elements and techniques that serve as weapons, relays, communication routes, and supports for the power and knowledge relations that invest human bodies and subjugate them by turning them into objects of knowledge (this was a big influence on Butler's Bodies that Matter).





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Foucault's Definition of Discipline- Summary


Closely related to Foucault’s analysis of power and knowledge is his concept of “discipline” or disciplines which appear in his famous book Discipline and Punish.

Discipline for Foucault is a type of power, a modality for its exercise. It comprises a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets. It is a “physics” of power, an “anatomy” of power, or a technology of power.

Disciplines are techniques for assuring the ordering of human groups with the following aims: to exercise power at the lowest cost and maximum efficiency and effectiveness; to increase the docility and utility of the people who are disciplined.

According to Foucault's analysis disciplines emerged in the course of 18th-19th centuries in Western Europe at the historical conjuncture of two processes: (a) The increase in national populations, and the increase in the population of institutions which needed to be controlled (such as schools, hospitals, prisons, armies, etc.) (b) The growth in the productive apparatus (the production of commodities, and the “production” of health, education, etc.)

What distinguished the disciplines from previous forms of power based on repression and violence are the following features:
n  Discipline objectifies the people on whom it is applied. This type of power forms a body of knowledge about the individuals it disciplines, rather than the deployment of visible signs of sovereignty.
n  Population increase and growth of capitalism are interrelated. Disciplining techniques would not have been possible without the latter, or useful, without the former.
n  There is a parallel between the emergence of a formally egalitarian juridical framework and a parliamentary, representative political regime in Western Europe, and the development and generalization of disciplinary mechanisms.
è Representative regime promises sovereignty by the people, but at the same time, panopticism and the disciplines guarantee submission of the people.

“The ‘Enlightenment,’ which discovered the liberties, also invented the disciplines.”
The main example that Foucault uses here is the “Panopticon,” a surveillance technique “invented” by Jeremy Bentham, the utilitarian theorist, for the observation of prisoners. The panopticon consisted of a tower from which, the prisoners down on the ground could be watched at all times.

According to Foucault, in the modern prison system, “the codified power to punish becomes the disciplinary power to observe.”

Foucault's idea about the panopticon or more generally with the disciplines is that, when one knows that one is being watched, one becomes more docile and more “useful.” Thus, discipline is a more efficient instrument of power than repression.


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