Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger stand as two towering German thinkers of the twentieth century, often placed side by side in histories of existentialism. Both were contemporaries, both wrestled with the meaning of existence beyond the reach of science, and both sought to articulate the experience of transcendence. Yet the similarities conceal profound differences. Heidegger made the “question of Being” the central task of philosophy, while Jaspers developed the idea of the Encompassing and philosophical faith. Where Heidegger leaned toward an ontological revolution, Jaspers advocated a more modest, dialogical, and pluralistic path beyond metaphysics.
Heidegger and the Question of Being
In Being and Time (1927), Heidegger set out to revive the forgotten question of Being (Sein): what does it mean that beings are? His analysis of Dasein—the human being as the one who asks about Being—was designed to show that existence is fundamentally temporal and finite. Death, anxiety, and authenticity are not marginal but central to our understanding of Being. Heidegger later turned away from existential analysis toward what he called “the history of Being,” reinterpreting philosophy as the task of listening to the way Being discloses itself through language and history.
This gave his project a sweeping ambition: to move beyond subject-object thinking and reorient Western philosophy altogether. But it also risked turning into an abstract, quasi-mystical narrative that only a select few could interpret. Heidegger’s path was solitary, austere, and—after his involvement with National Socialism—politically compromised.
Jaspers and the Encompassing
Jaspers’ project looked very different. Instead of the question of Being, he proposed the concept of the Encompassing (das Umgreifende). Reality, he argued, appears to us in several modes—empirical existence, consciousness, spirit, and Existenz. None of these modes is ultimate; each points beyond itself. The Encompassing names the horizon that holds them all together without being reducible to any one of them.
At the boundaries of these modes we encounter Transcendence. For Jaspers, transcendence is never an object of knowledge. It cannot be captured or defined. What we have are ciphers—symbols, myths, works of art—that gesture toward transcendence without exhausting it. Here he parts decisively from Heidegger: instead of claiming to unveil the destiny of Being, Jaspers insists on humility. Philosophy can orient us toward transcendence but never grasp it.
Philosophical Faith vs. Ontological Disclosure
The difference can be framed as faith versus disclosure. Heidegger speaks of aletheia, the unconcealment of Being, as if language itself might one day reveal the essence of existence. Jaspers, in contrast, speaks of philosophical faith: not a set of dogmas, but a stance of openness and trust in what lies beyond the limits of reason. His faith is dialogical, expressed in communication with others, nourished by diverse cultural and religious traditions.
This divergence had political implications. Heidegger’s emphasis on destiny and disclosure lent itself, at times, to authoritarian appropriation, while Jaspers’ humility and insistence on dialogue underpinned his post-war defense of democracy and pluralism.
A Shared Ground: Limits and Transcendence
Yet it would be unfair to oppose them too sharply. Both saw that science and technology, however powerful, leave us with unanswered questions. Both insisted that philosophy must deal with the limits of explanation, with death, finitude, and freedom. Both warned against reducing existence to calculation. In this sense, they converge as voices reminding us of what escapes mastery.
But at the fork in the path, Heidegger takes us into the ontological history of Being, while Jaspers turns us toward the existential openness of faith without dogma. Heidegger risks grandeur and obscurity; Jaspers risks modesty and incompleteness.
