Thursday, January 4, 2018

Indirect Speech Acts - Definition and Examples

In most language use in the world, there are three main types of sentences. They are declarative, interrogative, and imperative. Each of these sentence types has a different illocutionary force. Declarative for instance, has the asserting illocutionary force, while interrogative is for asking/questioning, and imperative is for ordering/requesting. These are the examples of the sentences types:
[1.8 a]. I am a man. (declarative/stating)
[1.8 b]. I am a man? (interrogative/asking)
[1.8 c]. Be a man! (Imperative/ordering)
[1.8 d]. I (hereby) order you to be a man. (imperative/ordering)
In these sentences it is possible to see the distinctions of the sentence types of declarative, interrogative, and imperative. However, other forms of sentences are sometimes used for an intention or illocutionary force other than the one that is duly intended in using the sentence types.
Searle (1979) introduced the idea of indirect illocutionary act which also known as indirect speech act. This is speaker's act of communicating with hearer more than what is actually said. It relies on the knowledgeable background information about the conversation shared by both speaker and hearer. In other words, indirect speech acts is the act of conducting an illocutionary act indirectly. For example, one might say "Could you open the door?", thereby asking the hearer if he/she could open the door. Nevertheless, this interrogative sentence also requests the hearer to open the window indirectly. Searle (1979:33) made a point by using this example:
[1.9] A says to a friend say: "Let's go to the movie tonight."
            the friend B answers: "I have to study for an exam."
In this example [1.9] it shows that B (second utterance) doesn't answered A's question, but instead he/she utter a declarative sentence and asserts that he/she needs to study for an exam. This utterance is in fact, a form of an indirect speech act, and an act of refusal. As quoted from Mey (2001), Searle proofs that the second utterance in [1.9] is an act of refusing A's suggestion to the movie using 10 steps:
Step 1: A has made a suggestion (to go to the movies) and B has uttered a statement (about having to study for exam). These are facts that happen between both speaker.(Factual background)
Step 2: A assumes that B to be cooperative in the conversation and expect an answer that is more relevant in fulfillment of the Cooperative principle's maxim of relevance.(Cooperative principle)
Step 3: Relevant answers in this case should be among the following: acceptance(yes, sure), rejection(no, thanks), counter-suggestion(Why don't we make it tomorrow?), suggestion for further discussion(That entirely depends on what's on), etc.(Theory of speech act)
Step 4: No relevant answer in step 3 matches the answer made by B. so it is possible to say that it is not one of these. (Taken from step 1 to 3). (Inference of step 3)
Step 5: Therefore, it is possible to assume that B means more (or something entirely different), assuming that his answer is relevant, his illocutionary must differ from the literal one. Step 2 and 4 is the most important step in this argument, as Searle says "unless we can distinguish the primary from the literal, there is no way of making sense of indirect speech act"(Inference from step 2 and 4)
Step 6: Studying for exam usually takes a lot of time which is precious while going to a movie will also take some precious times. This is something that a student cannot afford to lose, especially in pre-exam condition. (Factual background information)
Step 7: Hence, it seems that B cannot do both studying for the exam and going to the movie.(inferring step 6)
Step 8: Preparatory condition of a proposal are the ability and willingness to do the proposed act.(Theory of speech act)
Step 9: Therefore, it is possible to assume that B having to do something else, cannot accept the proposal to go to the movie. (Inferring from step 1, 7, and 8)
Step 10: Therefore, his utterance about having to study for exam is probably a form of rejection of A's proposal. (Inferring step 5 and 9)
            Indirect speech acts theory is closely related to the theory of Grice's maxim of cooperative principles, which will be explained in subchapter 2.2.1 Incongruity theory. As mentioned by Huang (2007), Searle uses Cooperative principles to find inferences to identify indirect speech acts. He also mentioned that Searle has developed three approaches to analyze whether an utterance is a direct or indirect speech act. First, by assuming dual illocutionary act. The first one is literal or direct and the other one is non-literal or indirect. Second, find the relevant felicity conditions. The third step is as mentioned above, using the cooperative principles.
            On the other hand, if the illocutionary force and the sentence type is matched directly, it is called a direct speech act. Like in example [1.8.d], in that sentence the speaker clearly says his/her intention which is ordering. 


Felicity Condition - Definition and Explanation (speech acts)

Felicity condition is referred to the effectiveness of speech acts use of the speaker. Austin (1962), said that in using speech acts one has to fulfill certain conditions regarding the act that is being uttered. For example, when one is making a promise to another person, he/she has to fulfill the condition of that the hearer or the promisee to have a need something to be promised, and the speaker or the promiser will have the intention to fulfill that need; therefore the act of promising will be valid to be regarded as felicitous condition. In definition felicity condition is a state when the utterances made has met the appropriate conditions such as, appropriate context, conventional existence, authority, and also speaker’s sincerity. Another example is when a speaker says such as [1.7], this kind of utterance are only validly recognized as a felicitous speech acts if the speaker meets required condition to be able to validate the context. This kind of utterance is usually used by a priest or any other religious leader to pronounce a marriage between a man and woman. Then this kind of utterance should be brought upon the wedding in a for instance, church. Moreover, without the special privilege of a priest (or any other individuals given the special privilege to marry people) this kind of utterance will not be recognized as an appropriate use of speech acts or it has a different intention.
[1.7] “I pronounce you husband and wife”
According to Yule (1996), there are several types of pre-conditions, the first there is a general conditions which referred to the participants, for instance, the language used must be understood by both speaker and hearer and it is used in serious matter. Second, there are content conditions which concern the content of the utterance; it has to be about future matter which affects the future act of the speaker.
Searle (1969) has set some more detailed rules concerning felicity condition for each illocutionary acts. In his accordance, several conditions have to be fulfilled for a sentence to be felicitous. These rules mostly regarding with psychological and the beliefs of the speaker or hearer and each one of them has to be fulfilled in order to create a felicitous act. These rules are prepositional content, preparatory condition, sincerity condition, and essential condition as explained in the following:
1.      Propositional content: Propositional content condition explains about the illocutionary forces specify the acceptable conditions regarding with propositional content. In other words, it is the proposed condition of the speaker or hearer.
2.      Preparatory condition: In attempt to conduct a felicitous illocutionary act the speaker has to have a certain beliefs about the speaker's act and conditions and also, the speaker is required to have the power of authority over the hearer.
3.      Sincerity condition: In performing felicitous act the performer must have a certain psychological attitude concerning the propositional content of the utterance. For example, when a person is making a promise, he/she must have an intention of keeping it.
4.      Essential condition: Essential condition of an utterance has to do with its intention to get the hearer to perform the intended act.
These are some felicity conditions as proposed by Searle (1969, p.66-67):
1.      Felicity conditions: Request
            Propositional content: Future act A of H.
            Preparatory condition: (i) H is able to do A.(ii) It is not obvious to both S and H    that H will do A in the normal course of events of his own accord.
            Sincerity condition: S wants H to do A.
            Essential condition: Counts as an attempt to get H to do A.
2.      Felicity conditions: Asserting/Stating
            Propositional content: Any proposition p.
            Preparatory condition: (i) S has evidence (reasons, etc) for the truth of p. (ii) It is   not obvious for both S and H that H knows (does not need to be reminded of,   etc) p.
            Sincerity condition: S believes p.
            Essential condition: Counts as an undertaking to the effect that p represents an      actual state of affairs.
3.      Felicity conditions: Question
            Propositional content: Any proposition.
            Preparatory condition: (i) S does not know the answer (ii) It is not obvious that H   will provide the information without being asked.
            Sincerity condition: S wants this information.
            Essential condition: Counts as an attempt to elicit this information.
4.      Felicity conditions: Thanking
            Propositional content: Past act A done by H.
            Preparatory condition: A benefits S and S believes A benefits S.
            Sincerity condition: S feels grateful or appreciative for A.
            Essential condition: Counts as an expression of gratitude or appreciation.
5.      Felicity conditions: Advising
            Propositional content: Future act A of H.
            Preparatory condition: (i) S has some reason to believe A will benefit H (ii) It is     not obvious to both S and H that H will do A in the normal course of events.
            Sincerity condition: S believes A will benefit H.
            Essential condition: Counts as an undertaking to the effect that A is in H‘s best     interest.
6.      Felicity conditions: Warning
Propositional content: Future event E.
            Preparatory condition: (i) S thinks E will occur and is not in H’s interest (ii) S         thinks it is not obvious to H that E will occur.
            Sincerity condition: S believes E is not in H’s best interest.
            Essential condition: Counts as an undertaking that E is not in H’s best interest.
7.      Felicity conditions: Congratulating
            Propositional content: Some event, act, etc., E related to H
Preparatory condition: (i)  E is in H's interest.
            Sincerity condition: S is pleased at E.
            Essential condition: Counts as an expression of pleasure at E.
8.      Felicity conditions: Greeting
            Propositional content: None
            Preparatory condition: S has just encountered (or been introduced to, etc.) H.
            Sincerity condition: None
            Essential condition: Counts as courteous recognition of H by S.
9.      Felicity conditions: Promising
Propositional content: Future action A by S
Preparatory condition: (i) S believes H wants A done (ii) S is able to do A. (iii) A has not already been done. (iv) H will benefit from A.
Sincerity condition: S is willing to do A.
Essential condition: Counts as attempt of S to make H believes about the future act A to be done by S.
            There are also some other revelation of felicity conditions by another linguists. According to Cook (1989), felicity condition of an order are:
10.  Felicity Conditions: Order
Propositional content: Future act A by H
Preparatory condition: (i) S believes A needs to be done (ii) H is able to do A (iii) H has the obligation to do A (iv) S has right to tell H to do A
Sincerity condition: S wants H to do A
Essential condition: Counts as an attempt to get H to do A. (p.36)
The difference with the requesting is that in ordering the speaker needs to have a right to do so and the hearer needs to have the obligation to do the act.
            Another revelation is made by Anne Barron (2003). She deduce the felicity condition of offering as 2 types of commisives (offer to do x) and commisives-directives  as following:

11.  Felicity Conditions: Offer (commisives)
Propositional Content: S predicates a future act x of S
Preparatory condition: (i) S is able to perform x (ii) H wants S to perform x
Sincerity condition: S intends to do x
            Essential condition: Counts as the undertaking by S of an obligation to do x,                                           should S want H to do so. (p.126)
12.  Felicity conditions: Offer (commisives-directive)
Propositional Content: S predicates a future act x of S
Preparatory condition: (i) S is able to perform x. (ii) H wants S to perform x
Sincerity condition: (i) S intends to do x. (ii) S wants H to do x
Essential condition: (i) Counts as the undertaking by S of an obligation to do x,                          should S want H to. (ii) As an attempt by S to get H to do                            x. (p.126)
She also points out the felicity condition for refusal for an offer as following:
13.  Felicity condition: Refusal of offer
Propositional Content: S predicates a future act x of H
Preparatory condition: (i) H is able to (not) perform x. S believes H is able (not)                             to perform x. (ii) It is obvious that H would (not) do x                           without being asked.
Sincerity condition: S wants H (not) to do x
Essential condition: Counts as an attempt to get H (not) to do x. (p.128)


Speech Acts Classifications

Searle (1979) suggests that speech acts consist of five general classifications to classify the functions or illocutionary of speech acts; these are declarations, representatives, expressives, directives, and commissive.
Declaration speech act is the act that makes the propositional content corresponds with the reality. This type of speech act is the same as Austin’s performative sentence. In order to perform a declarations effectively, the speaker must have a special contextual privileges that allow him/her to perform an also contextual declaration. For example, when a priest says “I pronounce you husband and wife”, the priest (in the context of marriage) has the privilege to pronounce marriage and when this utterance is performed, the man and woman is then changed from singles into married people from the moment on. On the contrary, if the speaker is not a priest or has the privilege to marry people, the utterance will not be effective.
The next type of speech act is commisive. Commissives speech acts are the act of commiting to future actions. This type of speech act shows the intention of the speaker in the future which will be made to happen in later moment. One example of commissive is “I will come to your home tonight”. This example shows that the speaker intends to come to the hearer’s home at the night time of the day the utterance is said. Therefore the speaker commits that he/she will come to the speaker’s home at night. In simple English, the term of this speech act is commonly called promise.
Expressives are the type of speech act that shows the expression of the speaker via utterance. For example, “I’m sorry”, “I like it”, “Thank you”. These examples show how the speaker feels about a situation. In time when the speaker spoils coffee over someone else’s shirt he/she will say “I’m sorry”, when in time the speaker is given a slice of cheese and likes it then he/she will say “I like it” or “Thank you”, and so on.
Other type of speech act is directives. This type of speech act aims to make someone else to do something that the speaker desires. For instance, “could you lend me a pen?” this utterance shows that the speaker requests a pen from someone else, he/she indirectly order the other person to lend him a pen this gesture is also available in a more direct way as “Lend me a pen!” The intention of these utterances is to make the hearer to perform the action conveyed in the utterance itself. Directives are also known as asking, ordering, requesting, inviting, advising, and begging.
The last type of speech act is representative. In representative speech act, the speaker’s intention is to assert the speaker’s belief. One example is “I’m a good guy”, the intention of this utterance is to show that the speaker is to make believe the hearer that the speaker is a good guy. 


Locutionary, Illocutionary, Perlocutionary Speech Acts

According to Austin (1962) in his speech acts theory, there are three actions related to speech acts. The first act is locutionary act which is the basic production of meaningful utterance. This act is much related to the hearer, if the hearer fails to understand what the speaker is saying then the speaker has failed to do a locutionary act. For example, when a person from Indonesia (he's in America for instance) talks to an American in bahasa 'apa kabar pak?' in English this utterance will not produce what is called as a meaningful linguistic expression. On the contrary when the speaker said 'how are you sir?' then the American would understand and it is a form of locutionary act.
In uttering a sentence or word, one must have a certain intention. Most of the time people produce well-formed utterances for a purpose, for instance the need to communicate something to someone or to provide facts. This second dimension is called Illocutionary act. An illocutionary act is accomplished via utterance with a communicative intention. A speaker may perform illocutionary act to make a promise, offer, explanation, etc, which is as proposed by Austin as illocutionary force.
In indicating illocutionary act Searle develops a device called Illocutionary Force Indicating Device (IFID).  It is an expression to show the illocutionary force of an utterance is. For example, in the utterance
[1.5] ‘I promise you this’
The word ‘promise’ in [1.5] is identified as performative verb which is one of the devices to identify illocutionary force. It is obviously indicated that the illocutionary force of the speaker is to promise something to the hearer as the speaker describes it explicitly. Sometimes one doesn’t explicitly mention their intention explicitly. When this happens another IFID can be used to identify the illocutionary force of the speaker. These are word orders, intonations, and stresses.
[1.6 a] You’re going!
[1.6 b] You’re going?
[1.6 c] Are you going?
In these utterances can be indicated that the illocutionary force of [1.6 a] is to tell or make decision, while [1.6 b] is requesting confirmation and [1.6 c] is asking about the hearer’s activity in the near future (emphasizing in word order difference).
            While locutionary act is the action of making a meaningful utterance and illocutionary act is performing an intentional utterance, perlocutionary act talks about producing the effect of the meaningful, intentional utterance. While making utterance that intent to make someone to drink coffee is successfully performed, the effect is that someone actually drank the coffee is also known as perlocutionary effect. Another example is when a boy says to a girl “You’re beautiful”, if the girl is attracted to the boy usually the girl will blush and feel happy; but on the contrary, if the girl is not attracted to the speaker, then usually she will only say “Thank you” and don’t feel as happy as in the first case.
In conclusion, locutionary act is the production of meaningful utterances and expressions (“go away!”, “come here”, “who are you?”, etc) which leads to illocutionary act, the intention of producing meaningful expression (promise, offering, etc), which causes the performance of perlocutionary act, which is the effect of the locutionary and illocutionary act (behavior, feeling, belief, etc).

Speech Acts Theory Explained with Examples

In communicating themselves people often uses utterances as a tool. These utterances sometimes perform something more than just a sound, or just a mere expression. The theory of speech acts was first established by the philosopher of language, J.L Austin (1962). He states that statements can not only be used to describe or state some facts. On the contrary, some actions can be done through words. He then developed a theory of performative sentence or performative utterances or performatives, which are utterances that do not only passively describe a fact but also perform an act and change the reality. In performative utterances or speech acts Austin believes that there is no true or false, but rather liked or not, void or not void. Some examples of performative utterances:
[1.1].When a bride on the altar said: 'I do'.
[1.2]. When a friend said: 'I bet twenty bucks he will lose'
[1.3] When someone calls 'shotgun' before a car ride
None of these utterances are true or false, neither have they described what the speaker is doing, yet it performs and acts of accepting ([1.1]) and betting ([1.2]). When the bride says 'I do' on the altar to the priest, the bride is not describing herself or a fact but she indulge herself into the marriage. Moreover, when a friend says [1.2], the performance of this utterance is as a proposal which suppose that when someone put a coin into a slot machine and when the taker accepts the bet by simply saying 'sure' or 'I take it’ then it's like the person is pulling the lever to see the outcome of the bet.
Austin categorizes two types of performatives, explicit performatives and implicit performatives (which also recognized as primary performatives). The distinction between these two categories is the use of a particular word. Explicit performance usually uses the word ‘hereby’ so that it sounded true. The word ’hereby’ act as the producer of action in the utterance. Examples: 
[I.3]. I hereby tell you to turn off the lamp.
[I.4]. Turn off the lamp!
 These examples distinguish the difference between implicit and explicit performatives. The sentence uttered in [I.3] is obviously an example of explicit performatives as it contains the word ‘hereby’. Of course, this kind of utterance is rarely used nowadays which makes the implicit performatives as the most widely used as in [I.4].
Later, another linguistic philosopher, John R. Searle, developed the theory of speech acts. In Searle’s definition, Speech acts are the basic or smallest form of linguistic communication. He also hypothesize that speaking a language is engaging in a rule-governed form of behavior (Searle, p16).  In accordance to Searle (1969), the units of linguistic communication is not the symbol, word or sentences but rather it is the production of the symbol, words or sentences. He pointed out that language is part of theory of action as language is a form of intentional, rule-governed behavior. To support his hypothesis he emphasize the fact that when someone is making noise with a paper as an example of communication, a message to other, then his action of making noise with the paper was made with certain intention and to be distinguished from natural phenomenon such as rain or waterfall.
 The definition of speech acts is often related to utterance. According to Yule (1996), speech acts is defined as actions that are performed via utterances. In English, speech acts are usually named as promise, request, apology, compliment, invitation, et cetera. These terms describe the use of speech acts in daily human activity. There are three types of main speech acts developed by Austin (1962). These are locutionary, illocutionary, perlocutionary acts, which is brought into detail in the next section.
See also:
Locutionary, Illocutionary, Perlocutionary SpeechActs
Speech Acts Classifications
Felicity Condition
Indirect Speech Acts


Monday, January 1, 2018

Summary: Chapter 15 in What Is This Thing Called Science? / Alan Chalmers

What Is This Thing Called Science? / Alan Chalmers
Chapter 15:Realism and anti- realism

-          Realism = science describes not just the observable world but also the world that lies behind the appearances
-          Doubts abut realism: extent to which claims about the unobservable world must be hypothetical to the extent that they do transcend what can be firmly established on the basis of observation
Global anti-realism
-          We are trapped within language and cannot break out of it to describe reality directly in a way that is independent of our theories
-          (Realist) correspondence theory of truth = a sentence is truth if and only if it corresponds to the facts
-          Liar paradox: e.g. I never tell the truth
-          Tarski: avoid paradoxes by distinguishing the object language (is being talked about) from the meta-language (in which the talking is done)
-           A theory is true if the world is as the theory says it is and false otherwise
-          Should scientific theories be taken as candidates for truth or as making claims about the observable world only? Neither side supports global anti-realism
-          Instrumentalists: theories are just useful instruments to predict results
-          Van Fraassen is not an instrumentalist for theories can be true or false, but the merit is judged in terms of its generality and simplicity and the extent to which it leads to new observations à constructive empiricism
-          Motivation of anti-realism = desire to restrict science to those claims that can be justified by scientific means. Evaluate theories solely in terms of their ability to order and predict observable phenomena
-          Theories can be discarded when they have outlived their usefulness, and the experimental and observational discoveries to which they have led retained
Objections and anti-realists response
-          Distinction between knowledge at the observational level (securely established) and is best seen as an heuristic aid à problem: theory dependence and fallibility of observation and experiment
-          Theories that are predictively successful have to be more or less true and not just instruments à response anti-realists: fact that a theory is productive need be no indication that it is true (historical proof)
-          Anti-realists insist that theories must be general and unified – embrace a wide range of phenomena
-          The unobservable has no place in science or should be treated merely as useful fiction (e.g. atomic theory) à response: only part of science that is subject to confirmation by observation and experiment should be treated as candidates for truth and falsity, but as science progresses and better instruments and experimental techniques are devised à range of claims that can be subject to confirmation is extended
Scientific realism
-          Science aims at true statements about what there is in the world and how it behaves at all levels. Science has made progress to this aim
-          Impossible to know that current theories are true, but they are truer than earlier theories
-          Hacking: pay attention to what can be practically manipulated in science. Entities in science can be shown to be real once they can be manipulated in a controlled way and used to bring about effects in something else
Conjectural realism (Popper)
-          Theories of the past have been falsified and replaced by superior theories
-           Problem: weakness of its claims. Science aims to achieve truth and there are ways to recognize how it falls short of this aim (there is no truth)
Structural realism
-          Middle ground realism and anti-realism: realist in that it attempt to characterizes the structure of reality: more and more capable. Representations are replaced over time
-          Duhem: theories cannot be taken as literal descriptions of reality because theoretical descriptions are idealized in a way that the world is not

-          Theoretical and observational knowledge
additional summaries in  philosophy of science

Some books about philosophy of science to consider:

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