Scientific Revolutions—“non-cumulative
developmental episodes in which an
older paradigm is replaced
in whole or in part by an incompatible
new one” (p. 92)
·
Scientific revolutions are “inaugurated by a
growing sense, . . . often restricted to a narrow subdivision of the scientific
community, that an existing paradigm has ceased to function adequately in the
exploration of an aspect of nature to which that paradigm itself had previously
led the way.” (p. 92)
·
Choices among competing paradigms cannot be
made on the basis of the “evaluative procedures” of normal science because
those procedures are parts of the competing paradigms and are therefore at
issue. (p. 94)
·
Therefore, in the debates about choice of
paradigms the arguments that are based on those paradigms are necessarily circular
and therefore are not logically or probabilistically compelling. However, this
does not mean that such arguments cannot be persuasive or persuasive.
·
“. . . [T]here is no standard higher than the
assent of the relevant [scientific] community.” (p. 94)
·
In principle, the discovery of new phenomena
does not necessitate abandoning the current paradigm. (p. 95)
·
However, historically, except for
pre-paradigm periods, assimilation of new theories and phenomena almost always
involves destruction of the previous and competition among “schools of
scientific thought.” (p. 96)
·
New discoveries can occur only if scientists’
expectations about nature and/or their instruments (laboratory, measuring,
etc.) turn out to be wrong. (p. 97)
·
Assimilating anomalies as instances of
scientific laws almost always
requires that a new paradigm be adopted and that the old paradigm be
destroyed. (p. 97)
·
New theories are invented to resolve
anomalies with respect to the current theory. Since a new theory can resolve
such anomalies only if it is logically incompatible with the current theory, it
must supplant the current theory. Consequently, a new paradigm, of which the
new theory is a part, must replace the current paradigm.
·
According to a view associated with logical
positivism,
o The
range of application of a scientific theory does not extend beyond the
phenomena and observational precision already dealt with by the existing
experimental evidence.
o Therefore,
one theory does not conflict with another theory if the two theories do not
make conflicting predictions.
o In
particular, a more extensive theory (e.g., Einstein’s theory of relativity)
does not conflict with a less extensive “special case” theory (e.g., Newtonian
dynamics) as long as the predictions of the latter are among those of the
former. (p. 98)
·
The logical positivist view has the following
implications:
1. Every
significant scientific theory is immune to attack, since it predicts nothing
about “new phenomena.” (pp. 99-100)
2. Scientific
theories cannot guide research, since they are not to be “tested” by checking
to see if their predictions of “new phenomena” are correct. (p. 100)
3. There
can be no “surprises, anomalies, or crises” with respect to an existing theory.
(pp. 100-101)
4. Therefore,
there can be no extraordinary science, which leads to the advances associated
with scientific revolutions. (pp. 100-101)
·
The positivist argument that Newtonian
dynamics is a “special case” of relativistic dynamics, which is based on deriving
Newtonian equations as limiting cases of relativistic equations where v/c<<1,
is flawed because it assumes that the meanings of important terms in both
theories (e.g., “mass”) are the same. However, the meanings are not the same.
(pp. 101-102)
·
Successive paradigms in an area of science
(e.g., Newtonian and relativistic dynamics) differ in the following respects:
1. They
have different implications about what entities the universe contains and how
those entities behave. (p. 103)
2. They
differ with respect to what methods, problems, and standards of solution are
accepted by the scientific community. (p. 103)
3. They
differ with respect to what qualifies as “scientific” and what is rejected as
“unscientific.” (p. 103)
·
When a scientific revolution occurs, the normal
science tradition that emerges is incommensurable with the old normal
science tradition. (p. 103)
·
Examples of differences among competing
paradigms with respect to accepted entities, significant problems, and
legitimate solutions include the following:
1. the
legitimacy of referring to “occult qualities” (pp. 104-105)
2. whether
“explaining gravity” is a significant scientific problem (p. 105)
3. whether
there are such things as “innate forces”—gravitational, electromagnetic,
chemical affinities, etc. (pp. 105-107)
·
The standards determining what problems are
significant and what solutions are legitimate are internal to paradigms. There
is no standpoint external to competing paradigms from which to judge those
standards. Therefore, those standards may change but they do not become
“higher” or “lower.” (p. 108)
·
Disagreements among the supporters of
competing paradigms about which unsolved problems are more important than
others raise value issues that cannot be resolved within normal science.
(p. 110)
See also: